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International Campaign to Ban Landmines
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or “Ottawa
Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines
and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all,
including:
• No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any
circumstances;
• Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
• More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW); and
• Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.
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Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War

P

eace agreements may be signed and hostilities
may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of
conflict.
Antipersonnel mines are munitions
designed to explode from the presence,
proximity, or contact of a person. Antivehicle
mines are munitions designed to explode from the
presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed
to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and
indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a
child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced
during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or
injure civilians decades later.
ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict.
Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate
as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These
unstable explosive devices are left behind during and
after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines.
Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) is explosive
ordnance that has not been used during armed conflict
but has been left behind and is no longer effectively
controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades,
mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster
munition remnants. Under the international legal
definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.
Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing
threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads,
footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders,
in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other
places where people are carrying out their daily activities.
They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs,
and inhibit freedom of movement. They prevent the
repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people,
and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.
These weapons instill fear in communities, whose
citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but
have no possibility to farm other land, or take another

route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when
medical systems are drained by the cost of attending
to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must
spend money clearing mines rather than paying for
education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause
appalling human suffering, but that they are also a lethal
barrier to development and post-conflict reconstruction.
There are solutions to the global landmine and
ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (officially the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and
on their Destruction) provides the best framework for
governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in
areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who
join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production,
and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They
must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within
four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined
areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years.
In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must
provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine
survivors, their families and communities, and support
for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent
mine incidents.
This legal instrument provides a framework for
taking action, but it is up to governments to implement
treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to work together with governments
to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.
The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign,
the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of
landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians
can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine,
children can play without mistaking an unexploded
submunition for a toy, and communities don’t bear the
social and economic impact of mines or ERW presence
for decades to come.

Mine risk education
for children at Daw
Hsaw Phya School in
Myanmar.
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International Campaign to Ban
Landmines
The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries,
working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate
antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace
Prize jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in
recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty.
The campaign is a loose, flexible network whose
members share the common goal of working to eliminate
antipersonnel landmines.
The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of
six NGOs: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch,
Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians
for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America
Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the
horrendous effects of mines on the communities they
were working with in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and
Latin America, and saw how mines hampered and even
prevented their development efforts in these countries.
They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed
to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the
solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.
The founding organizations brought to the
international campaign practical experience of the
impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective
of the different sectors they represented: human rights,
children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues,
and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member
campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word
through their networks; news of this new coalition and
the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines
soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized
conferences and campaigning events in many countries
to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need
for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to
enable them to be effective advocates in their respective
countries.
Campaign members worked at the local, national,
regional, and global level to encourage their governments
to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew
rapidly, and today there are campaigns in some 100
countries.
The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on
3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It was due to the
sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the
Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.
Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve
with changing circumstances. The early days of the
campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive
treaty banning antipersonnel mines. Once this goal was
achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries
join the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement
their treaty obligations. Today, the campaign also
encourages States Parties to complete their major treaty
obligations within a decade, a target agreed in the 2014
Maputo Declaration.
The ICBL works to promote the global norm against
mine use and advocates for countries who have not
joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign
iv

also urges non-state armed groups to abide by the spirit
of the treaty.
Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, which
provides the most effective framework for eliminating
antipersonnel landmines. This includes working in
partnership with governments and international
organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation,
from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim
assistance.
On 1 January 2011 the Cluster Munition Coalition
(CMC) merged with the ICBL to become the ICBL-CMC.
The CMC and ICBL remain two separate and strong
campaigns. In the few years prior to the merger, the
ICBL, CMC, and the Monitor had increasingly been
sharing resources to achieve their similar goals: to rid the
world of landmines and cluster munitions. The merger
has strengthened the work toward these goals while still
ensuring that the three components (CMC, ICBL, and the
Monitor) continue to be the global authorities in their
distinct areas of work. The ICBL-CMC is committed to
pushing for the complete eradication of antipersonnel
mines and cluster munitions. The campaign has been
successful in part because it has a clear campaign message
and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and
flexible strategy; and an effective partnership with other
NGOs, international organizations, and governments.

Landmine and Cluster Munition
Monitor
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides
research and monitoring for the ICBL and the CMC
and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the
de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty
and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors
and reports on States Parties’ implementation of, and
compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention
on Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the
international community’s response to the humanitarian
problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and
other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor
represents the first time that NGOs have come together
in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to
monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and
to regularly document progress and problems, thereby
successfully putting into practice the concept of civil
society-based verification.
In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor
as an ICBL initiative. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also
functionally became the research and monitoring arm of
the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from
Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition
Monitor (known as “the Monitor”) to reflect its increased
reporting on the cluster munition issue. Responsibility for
the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring
and Research Committee, a standing committee of the
ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-CMC produces
and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition
Monitor as separate publications.
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The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a
formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society
to hold governments accountable to the obligations
they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines
and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive
collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available
information. Although in some cases it does entail
investigative missions, the Monitor is not designed to
send researchers into harm’s way and does not include
hot war-zone reporting.
Monitor reporting complements the transparency
reporting by states required under international treaties.
It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust,
and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the
successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster
munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established
in recognition of the need for independent reporting and
evaluation.
The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion
on mine-, cluster munition-, and ERW-related issues, and
to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free
of mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works
in good faith to provide factual information about issues
it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international
community as a whole.
The Monitor system features a global reporting
network and an annual report. A network of more than
30 researchers and a 13-person Editorial Team gathered
information to prepare this report. The researchers come
from the CMC and ICBL’s campaigning coalitions and
from other elements of civil society, including journalists,
academics, and research institutions.
Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done
by the Monitor.
As was the case in previous years, the Monitor
acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by
the time, resources, and information sources available.
The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated,
corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and
corrections from governments and others are sought,
in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search
for accurate and reliable information on an important
subject.

About this report
This is the 17th annual Landmine Monitor report. It is
the sister publication to the Cluster Munition Monitor
report, first published in November 2010. Landmine
Monitor 2015 provides a global overview of the landmine
situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries
and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at
www.the-monitor.org/cp.
Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use,
production, trade, and stockpiling in every country in the
world, and also includes information on contamination,
clearance, casualties, victim assistance, and support for
mine action. The report focuses on calendar year 2014,
with information included up to November 2015 when
possible.
v
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andmine Monitor 2015 details continued progress
toward the goal of a mine-free world, but also
finds challenges with non-state armed groups
using landmines in more countries and a oneyear rise in global casualties. While the Monitor
reports an increase in clearing mine-affected
areas in 2014, many states remain behind on
their clearance plans and global funding for mine action
declined for a second year in a row.

Treaty Status
There are 162 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and
one signatory—Marshall Islands—that has yet to ratify.

Use
From October 2014 through October 2015, the
government forces of Myanmar, North Korea, and
Syria—all states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty—used
antipersonnel landmines.
• North Korea denied emplacing new landmines along
a South Korean patrol route in the demilitarized zone
between the two countries, but a UN Command
Military Armistice Commission investigation
concluded otherwise in an August 2015 report.
• Recent Syrian government use was first
documented in 2011, whereas use by the
government of Myanmar (formerly Burma) has
been documented annually by the Monitor since
1999. However, available information indicates
that new mine use in Myanmar has been at a
significantly lower level over the past several years.
Non-state armed groups used antipersonnel mines or
victim-activated improvised explosive devices acting
as antipersonnel mines in 10 countries: Afghanistan,
Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia,
Ukraine, and Yemen, a significant increase.
• The last time the Monitor reported 10 or more
countries in which non-state armed groups

© Sean Sutton/MAG, May 2014

used antipersonnel mines or victim-activated
improvised explosive devices was 2006.
There was no confirmed new use of antipersonnel
landmines by a State Party during the reporting
period. The Treaty’s new Committee on Cooperative
Compliance met with representatives of States Parties
Sudan, Ukraine, Turkey, and Yemen to engage each in
a cooperative dialogue regarding allegations of past
use of antipersonnel mines, in some cases dating back
to 2008.

This Valmara
bounding
fragmentation
landmine will be
destroyed in-situ in
Iraq.

Casualties
In 2014, recorded casualties caused by mines, victimactivated improvised explosive devices that act as
antipersonnel mines, cluster munition remnants, and
other explosive remnants of war (ERW) rose compared
to 2013, but was the second lowest annual total since the
Monitor started recording casualties in 1999.
• In 2014, a global total of 3,678 casualties were
recorded, a 12% increase compared with the total
of 3,308 in 2013.
• The incidence rate of 10 casualties per day for 2014
is about 40% of that reported in 1999, when there
were approximately 25 casualties each day.
• In many states and areas, numerous casualties
go unrecorded, especially in conflict settings;
therefore, the true casualty figure is anticipated
to be much higher. Nevertheless, the decrease in
casualties recorded since the entry of the Mine
Ban Treaty is even more significant because of
improvements in recording over time.
Casualties were identified in 54 states and four other
areas in 2014, of which 37 are States Parties to the Mine
Ban Treaty.
• The vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW
casualties were civilians (80%) where their status
was known, which is nearly identical to 2013.
• In 2014, children accounted for 39% of all civilian
casualties where the age was known.
L a n d m i n e M o n i to r 2 0 15 / 1
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• Women and girls made up 12% of all casualties where
the sex was known, the same as in 2012 and 2013.
• Seventy percent of recorded global casualties
occurred in States Parties.
• Afghanistan experienced the greatest single rise in
casualties, with 1,296 recorded in 2014 compared to
1,050 in 2013. The bulk of the increase was due to
victim-activated improvised explosive devices, with
809 recorded in 2014 compared to 567 in 2013.
• In 2014, factory-made antipersonnel mines and
victim-activated improvised explosive devices
acting as antipersonnel mines caused the majority
of all casualties (49% combined).
• The proportion of casualties caused by victimactivated improvised explosive devices increased
significantly (to 31%, up from 22% in 2013), with
the casualties in Afghanistan accounting for the
majority of the increase.

Contamination and Land
Release
Fifty-seven states and four other areas have an identified
threat of antipersonnel mine contamination as of October
2015, including 33 States Parties and 24 states not party. A
further five States Parties have either suspected or residual
mine contamination. At least 200km2 of land was reported
to be cleared of landmines in 2014, an increase from an
estimated 185km2 in 2013—destroying more than 230,000
antipersonnel and 11,500 antivehicle mines
• As in 2013, the largest total clearance of mined
areas in 2014 was achieved in Afghanistan,
Cambodia, and Croatia, which together accounted
for 75% of recorded clearance.
• Over the past five years, approximately 976km2
of mined areas have been cleared and nearly 1.48
million antipersonnel mines and more than 82,000
antivehicle mines have been destroyed.
In 2014, Burundi completed clearance of its suspected
mined areas and Mozambique declared itself free of
landmines in September 2015.
• As of November 2015, 29 states and one other area
have declared themselves cleared of mines since
the treaty entered into force in 1999.
• Oman declared for the first time that it has
areas suspected of being contaminated with
antipersonnel mines in its initial Article 7
transparency report, and therefore has been
added to the list of contaminated States Parties.
New antipersonnel contamination arising in
Ukraine has resulted in it being added to the list of
contaminated States Parties.
• Of the 33 States Parties that have confirmed
outstanding mine clearance obligations, 27 have
been granted at least one extension period, but
only three States Parties appear to be on track to
meet their Article 5 clearance deadlines.
• In 2014, four States Parties submitted extension
requests, all of which were approved at the Third
2 / L a n d m i n e M o n i to r 2 0 15

Review Conference: Democratic Republic of
Congo, Eritrea, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. In 2015,
four States Parties submitted extension requests:
Cyprus, Ethiopia, Mauritania, and Senegal. These
are awaiting approval at the Fourteenth Meeting
of States Parties to be held 30 November to 4
December 2015.
• Massive antipersonnel mine contamination,
defined by the Monitor as more than 100km2,
is believed to exist only in Afghanistan, Angola,
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia,
Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, and Turkey, as well
as Western Sahara. Increased use of land release
methodologies—technical and non-technical
surveys—have improved the understanding of the
remaining mine contamination in many countries.

Support for Mine Action
Donors and affected states together contributed
approximately US$610 million in international and
national support for mine action in 2014, a decrease of
$30 million (5%) from 2013 and the second year in a row
of declining support.
International assistance in 2014 was $417 million, a
decrease of $23 million from 2013.
• A total of 42 states and three other areas received
support from 33 donors.
• Contributions from the top five mine action
donors—the United States, the European Union,
Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands—accounted
for 72% of all donor funding.
• This is the ninth consecutive year that international
contributions for mine action have totaled more
than $400 million.
• Support to mine action activities in Afghanistan
dropped considerably, from $68 million in 2013
to $49 million in 2014, although it was still 30%
higher than funding received by the second largest
recipient (Lao PDR: $37 million).
• The top five recipient states—Afghanistan, Lao
PDR, Iraq, Angola, and Cambodia—received 45%
of all international contributions.
• International funding was distributed among the
following sectors: clearance and risk education
(68% of all funding), victim assistance (7%),
advocacy (5%), capacity-building (4%), and
stockpile destruction (less than 1%). The remaining
16% was not disaggregated by the donors.
Thirteen affected states provided $194 million in national
support for their own mine action programs, $7 million
less than in 2013 (a 4% decrease), when 18 affected
countries reported contributing $201 million.
In addition to those contributions, appropriations
from the UN General Assembly for mine action within
peacekeeping operations provided $166 million in 2014,
an increase of 10% compared with 2013.
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Victim Assistance
Most States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with
significant numbers of mine victims made considerable
progress in victim assistance under the Cartagena Action
Plan (2009–2014) and continued to do so under the
Maputo Action Plan Action (2014–2019), but still face
many challenges. Findings detailed below relate to the 31
States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims.
• Through survey, understanding of the needs of
mine victims continued to improve in more than
half of the States Parties.
• Approximately two-thirds of the States Parties
had active coordination mechanisms or relevant
national plans in place to advance efforts to assist
mine victims and uphold their rights. However,
expired action plans for assistance in Afghanistan
and Sudan had not yet been updated, while several
States Parties plans remained inactive or in draft:
Algeria, Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, South Sudan, and Yemen.
• In most of the States Parties, assistance efforts
have been integrated into other disability rights
and development efforts, through collaborative
coordination, combined planning, and survivor
participation. However, victim assistance coordination
efforts stalled in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic
Republic of Congo, and Uganda.
• In nearly all of the States Parties, survivors were
joining in coordination processes that affect their
lives, although in many countries their participation
must be better supported, especially in decisionmaking roles.
• More than half of the States Parties had included
some information on victim assistance activities
and progress in their formal reports covering
calendar year 2014.

• At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty,
including six landmine producers, have enacted
formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel
mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan,
Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the United
States.
Down from a total of more than 50 producing states
before the Mine Ban Treaty’s existence, currently
only 11 states are identified as potential producers of
antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar,
North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea,
and Vietnam.
• Active production may be ongoing in as few as four
countries: India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South
Korea.
Non-state armed groups in Afghanistan, Colombia,
Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, and Tunisia produce
antipersonnel mines, mostly in the form of victimactivated improvised explosive devices.

Stockpile Destruction
Collectively, the States Parties have destroyed more than
49 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including
more than 530,000 destroyed in 2014.
• Finland completed destruction of its stockpile of
one million mines during the reporting period.
• More than nine million antipersonnel mines await
destruction by six States Parties.
• Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine remain in violation
of the treaty after having failed to complete the
destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year
deadline. Belarus and Greece had a deadline of
1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1
June 2010.

Transfer and Production
For the past decade, the global trade in antipersonnel
mines has consisted of a low level of illicit and
unacknowledged transfers, but the appearance of mines
in Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen indicates that some form
of market for, and trade in, antipersonnel mines exists.
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Banning Antipersonnel Mines

I

n these uncertain times, universal adherence to
the Mine Ban Treaty’s humanitarian and disarmament provisions matters more than ever. Non-state
armed groups (NSAGs) in 10 countries have used
landmines in the past year (October 2014–October
2015), usually victim-activated improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) rather than manufactured mines. The
new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in conflicts in
Ukraine and Yemen and the continuing large-scale use of
victim-activated IEDs in Afghanistan and Iraq are particularly disturbing.
Yet new use of antipersonnel mines by states
remains a relatively rare phenomenon, with use by the
government forces of Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria
in the past year.
States Parties are steadily implementing the Mine Ban
Treaty and the same can be said of the vast majority of the
35 countries that remain outside it, as they also appear to
abide by the Treaty’s key provisions despite not acceding.
Several States Parties continue to face serious
compliance concerns, particularly with respect to missed
stockpile destruction deadlines and repeated mine
clearance deadline extensions.1 However, governments
and international organizations, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) continue to work
together to support those facing challenges. The Mine
Ban Treaty’s newly formed Committee on Cooperative
Compliance has been diligently following-up on past
allegations of landmine use by States Parties.
This shows the enduring and popular support for the
Mine Ban Treaty, which was adopted on 18 September
1997 and entered into force on 1 March 1999. There are
now a total of 162 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty;
most recently Oman acceded in August 2014.
1

For details on extension requests, please see the Mine Action chapter
of this publication.

Use of antipersonnel landmines
In this reporting period—October 2014 through
October 2015—the Monitor has confirmed new use
of antipersonnel mines by the government forces of
Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria and by NSAGs in
Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan,
Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen.
This is a significant increase of use by NSAGs from
recent years, especially in States Parties.2

Visitors examine
global landmine
use and other
maps as part of a
photo gallery and
treasure hunt to
raise awareness of
the global landmine
issue in Taiwan.

Locations of antipersonnel mine and
victim-activated IED use, October 2014–
October 2015
Use by
government
forces

Use by non-state
armed groups

Korea, North
Myanmar
Syria

Afghanistan
Colombia
Iraq
Libya
Myanmar

Pakistan
Syria
Tunisia
Ukraine
Yemen

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are in bold.

Use in States Parties
Yemen
Houthi forces, also known as Ansar Allah, emplaced
antipersonnel landmines in the Yemeni port of Aden before
withdrawing from the city in July 2015. Yemen had declared
the completion of mine clearance in Aden in 2009.3
According to the information from Yemeni mine
action officials, the emergency clearance of landmines
2

NSAGs used mines in at least seven countries in 2013–2014, eight
countries in 2012–2013, six countries in 2011–2012, four countries in
2010, six countries in 2009, seven countries in 2008, and nine countries in 2007.

3

Email from Ahmed Alawi, Information Management System Officer,
Operations Department, Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC), 20 May
2010.
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and explosive remnants of war (ERW) began on 11 July
2015 in several residential districts of Aden previously
controlled by Houthi forces, including Khormaksar,
Jaulaa, and Green City in the Dar Saad neighborhood,
as well as Bir Ahmad and Amran in al-Buraika, also near
Aden. By 12 August 2015, the teams had removed 91
antipersonnel mines of two types from Aden as well as
316 IEDs, 666 antivehicle mines, and various ERW.4
The two types of antipersonnel mines cleared from
Aden were the PPM-2 (manufactured in the former East
Germany) and a GYATA-64 (previously manufactured in
Hungary).5 In its transparency reports since 2000, Yemen
has never reported either of these mine types as stockpiled
or retained. It was first reported that these antipersonnel
mines had been seen in Yemen in April 2013.6 Also
present in Aden were TM-62 and TM-57 antivehicle mines
manufactured in the former Soviet Union.
The NGO Doctors Without Borders (MSF), which
provides emergency medical care in Aden, reported
more than 35 people injured, mostly children, between
early August and mid-September.7

Ukraine
In June 2015, Ukrainian representatives estimated that
8% of eastern Ukraine is either affected or suspected to
be affected by antipersonnel mines and IEDs as well as
ERW from the conflict between Ukrainian government
forces and Russian-backed rebels that erupted in early
2014—initially in Crimea in the south, then in Ukraine’s
eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk.8 There is not
believed to have been any significant landmine use since
the February 2015 ceasefire.
Multiple broadcast media reports by Russian
television outlets clearly show that antipersonnel mines
4

Human Rights Watch (HRW) Press Release, “Yemen: Houthis
Used Landmines in Aden,” 5 September 2015, www.hrw.org/
news/2015/09/05/yemen-houthis-used-landmines-aden. Unless otherwise noted all information in this section is from this release.

5

PPM-2 and GYATA-64 mines have been used elsewhere in Yemen
in recent years. Foreign Policy reported that in late 2011, Republican
Guard forces laid approximately 8,000 landmines, including GYATA-64
and PPM-2 mines, at Bani Jarmooz. Joe Sheffer, “Revenge Landmines of the Arab Spring,” Foreign Policy, 25 May 2013, foreignpolicy.
com/2013/05/25/revenge-landmines-of-the-arab-spring/.
Human
Rights Watch also recorded the use of PPM-2 mines in Sanaa, one
of which maimed a 10-year-old boy on 4 March 2012. ICBL-CMC,
“Country Profile: Yemen: Mine Ban Policy,” 6 December 2013, www.
the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2013/yemen/mine-ban-policy.aspx.

6

During a visit to Bani Jormooz in April 2013, an international journalist said “residents produced bags of mines recovered from the
ground using rudimentary methods. They included four different
types of anti-personnel mines, including large numbers of Hungarian
manufactured GYATA-64 type mines, known to be among the most
powerful anti-personnel devices ever manufactured. Locals also produced plastic East German PPM2 mines and two variations of Soviet
wooden PMD-5 [sic] landmines—all were manufactured before the
end of the Cold War.” Joe Sheffer, “Revenge Landmines of the Arab
Spring,” Foreign Policy, 25 May 2013, foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/25/
revenge-landmines-of-the-arab-spring/.

and multipurpose munitions equipped with victimactivated fuzes were used by Russian-backed rebels. In
June 2015, the Russian television network Russia 1 aired a
report showing members of the rebel “Spartak Battalion”
emplacing MON-50 mines with MUV fuzes and tripwires
near Marinka in Donetsk province.9 On 17 November
2014, a Ukrainian media report highlighted that
Ukrainian security forces seized equipment purportedly
in possession of a rebel sabotage group operating in
government-controlled territory in the Kharkov region.10
Their equipment included MON-50 and OZM-72
mines along with mechanical pull MUV fuzes, tripwire
assemblies, and electrical initiation devices.
This
equipment
includes
factory-produced
antipersonnel mines never stockpiled or previously
destroyed by the Ukrainian government. A video
produced by a pro-rebel media source in July 2014,
shows combatants associated with the rebel Zarya
Battalion emplacing a PMN-4 antipersonnel mine, in
conjunction with emplacing TM-62M antivehicle mines
at an unknown location in eastern Ukraine.11 This type of
mine has never been declared to be stockpiled by Ukraine
and was only first publicly displayed by Russia in 1993.12
Victim-activated booby-traps have also been used,
however, it is unclear who is responsible. The “Raising
Red Flags” report by Armament Research Services
presents on page 61 a photograph, provided by Vice
News reporter Harriet Salem, of an RGD-5 hand grenade
taped to a tree and fitted with an UZRGM-type fuze
affixed to a trip wire.13 Victim-activated booby-traps and
victim-activated IEDs are banned by the 1997 Mine Ban
Treaty.
Additionally, both sides have used several types
of hand-emplaced antivehicle mines and Ukrainian
government forces have used remotely-delivered
PTM-1G antivehicle mines. Ukraine admitted in June
2015 that its forces emplaced antivehicle mines but noted
that the locations are fixed with reference to at least
two indestructible landmarks, fenced off, and marked
with special signs, and that records of mined areas are
distributed in no less than three copies.14
In June 2014 and June 2015, the government of
Ukraine declared in statements to Mine Ban Treaty
States Parties that it had not used antipersonnel
9

“Репортаж с линии соприкосновения в ДНР : Боестолкновения
с украми и установка растяжек,” YouTube, 14 June 2015, youtu.be/
H0KmJq9cww0.

10

“Особо опасная группа из 12 диверсантов, причастная ко взрыву
в харьковском пабе, задержана, - СБУ. ФОТОрепортаж,” Censor, 17
November 2014, censor.net.ua/photo_news/312355/osobo_opasnaya_
gruppa_iz_12_diversantov_prichastnaya_ko_vzryvu_v_harkovskom_
pabe_zaderjana_sbu_fotoreportaj.

11

“Жизнь батальона Заря Часть 7 Минирование Life of Zarya battalion,”
YouTube, 31 July 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=PqSsgLNaJuo.

12

“Противопехотная мина ПМН-4,” Saper, n.d., undated, www.saper.
etel.ru/mines-2/pmn-4.html.

7

Human Rights Watch Press Release, "Houthis Used Landmines
in Aden," 5 September 2015, www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/05/
yemen-houthis-used-landmines-aden.

13

Armament Research Services, “Raising Red Flags: An Examination
of Arms and Munitions in the Ongoing Conflict in Ukraine, 2014,”
November 2014, p. 61.

8

Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings,
Geneva, 26 June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/
APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_COMPLIANCE_COMMITTEE_Ukraine.pdf.

14

Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meeting of the Committee on
Cooperative Compliance, Geneva, 26 June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_
COMPLIANCE_COMMITTEE_Ukraine.pdf.
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Landmines reported in Ukraine since 2014
Category
Antipersonnel

Antivehicle
Antilanding

Designation

Origin

Type

Initiation

MON-50

Russia/USSR

Fragmentation

Tripwire/command

MON-90

Russia/USSR

Fragmentation

Tripwire/command

MON-100

Russia/USSR

Fragmentation

Tripwire/command

OZM-72

Russia/USSR

Fragmentation

Tripwire/command

PMN-4

Russia

Blast

Pressure

POM-2/POM-2R

Russia/USSR

Fragmentation

Tripwire/self-destruct

TM-62M

Russia/USSR

Blast

Pressure

PTM-1G

Russia/USSR

Blast

Pressure/self-destruct

PDM-1M

Russia/USSR

Blast

Tilt rod

Note: Use of a tripwire to initiate any explosive device is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

landmines in the conflict and accused Russian forces
of laying landmines in Ukraine.15 Information provided
in December 2014 by Ukrainian government officials
states, “no banned weapons” had been used in the
“Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by Ukrainian armed
forces or forces associated with them, such as volunteer
battalions.16
Representatives of Ukraine stated in June 2015 that
retained or stockpiled antipersonnel mines under their
control are not available for issue to troops and remain
strictly controlled by the high command.17 They did admit
however, that some mines were stored in the Crimea and
are no longer under Ukrainian government control.
The ICBL has expressed concern at reports of use and
seizures of landmines in Ukraine.18 It urges parties to the
conflict to ensure that no antipersonnel mines are used
by any actor and to destroy any antipersonnel mines they
have seized or otherwise acquired.

Afghanistan
Afghanistan has experienced extensive use of victimactivated IEDs by armed groups, mainly the Taliban, the
Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami, which oppose the
government. In September 2015, Afghan officials said
that the Taliban had recently laid landmines and boobytraps around Kunduz after seizing the city.19 The UN
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported
15

Ibid.; and submission of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, Mozambique, 18 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Ukraine-information.pdf.

16

The Military Prosecutor confirmed that an assessment had been
undertaken to ensure that stockpiled KSF-1 and KSF-1S cartridges
containing PFM-1 antipersonnel mines, BKF-PFM-1 cartridges with
PFM-1S antipersonnel mines, and 9M27K3 rockets with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines are not operational, but rather destined for destruction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty.

17

Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meeting of the Committee on
Cooperative Compliance, Geneva, 26 June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_
COMPLIANCE_COMMITTEE_Ukraine.pdf.

18

“Troubling Reports of Landmines Seizures and Use in Eastern
Ukraine,” ICBL, 8 July 2014, www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/
news/2014/troubling-reports-of-landmine-seizures-and-use-in-eastern-ukraine.aspx.

19

“Afghan forces struggle to retake Kunduz city from Taliban,” The Express
Tribune (AFP), 30 September 2015, tribune.com.pk/story/964837/
afghan-forces-struggle-to-retake-kunduz-city-from-taliban/.

that anti-government forces were using victim-activated
IEDs in increasing numbers during early 2015. It
documented new use of victim-activated IEDs in Kunduz
in April, May, and June 2015, resulting in new civilian
casualties. UNAMA has stated that victim-activated IEDs
are the most common form of IED currently being used
in Afghanistan. Victim-activated (pressure plate) IEDs
were responsible for almost half of the casualties from
explosive weapons recorded during the first half of 2015.20

Colombia
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) continues to
use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on a regular basis near
their campsites or bases, on main transit routes, and around
caches of explosives, weapons, medicine, and clothing.21

Iraq
Islamic State and possibly other forces fighting the
government of Iraq have used IEDs and explosive boobytraps extensively since 2014.22 The extent to which the IEDs
are command-detonated or victim-activated is not clear.
In June 2015, Iraq blamed “terrorist armed groups
and Daesh” (Islamic State) for “a dramatic increase in
the number of mines, UXOs [unexploded ordinance]
and IEDs” in the country.23 In May 2015, Reuters reported
that Islamic State fighters laid landmines in Ramadi, the
20

UNAMA, “Afghanistan Mid-year Report 2015 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Kabul, August 2015, pp. 8, 11, 30, 45, bit.ly/
LM15Banf20. For additional information, see the Casualties and Victim
Assistance chapter of this publication.

21

June 2014–June 2015 media tracking of landmine use in Colombia
by Camilo Serna, Operational Coordinator and Monitor Researcher,
Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM), emailed to the
Monitor on 11 July 2015. Media database of new use, unknown use,
and seizures with 200 entries from the following Colombian media
sources: El Tiempo, Ejército Nacional, RCN Radio, El País, La Opinión,
La Voz del Cinaruco, El Líder, El Espectador, UARIV, HSB Noticias,
PAICMA, Diario del Huila, El Colombiano, Crónica del Quindío, La
Nación, El Nuevo Día, and Vanguardia.

22

See for example, “ISIS’s latest threat: laying landmines,” IRIN, 6
November 2014, www.irinnews.org/report/100797/isis-s-latest-threatlaying-landmines; and Mike Giglio, “The Hidden Enemy in Iraq,”
Buzzfeed, 19 March 2015, http://www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/thehidden-enemy-in-iraq#.wu97dG1lX.

23

Statement of Iraq, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Standing Committee
Meetings, 25 June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/
APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2c_ARTICLE_5_COMMITTEE_-_Iraq.pdf.
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capital of Iraq’s western desert province of Anbar.24 The
NGO Conflict Armament Research stated in April 2015
that Islamic State forces are producing and deploying
IEDs on an industrial scale.25

Tunisia
New casualties, due to victim-activated explosives among
the Tunisian military engaged in operations against
militants in Jebel Al-Cha’anby in Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine
governorate near the Algerian border, continued to occur.
In December 2014, one government soldier was killed
and one injured by a landmine explosion on Mount
Samama in Kasserine governorate.26 In August 2015,
two soldiers were killed by landmines during an army
operation on Mount Mghila in the Kasserine region.27
Due to the ongoing nature of the conflict, it is likely many
of these devices were recently emplaced.

Use in states not party
North Korea
On 4 August 2015, two South Korean soldiers on patrol
on the South Korean side of the demilitarized zone
(DMZ) at Yeonchon in Gyeonggi province were injured
by newly laid antipersonnel mines. One soldier had both
legs amputated while the other lost his foot. The South
Korean military accused North Korea of laying the mines,
which were identified as PMD-6 wooden box mines made
in North Korea.28
North Korea issued a denial of use, stating it only
used mines in self-defense.29 At a press conference in
New York on 21 August, the North Korean ambassador
asserted that the South Korean military had identified
the mine as an M-14 on 4 August and then changed it
to a North Korean box mine on 10 August for political
purposes.30
An investigation by the United States (US)-led UN
Command’s Military Armistice Commission examined
the area after the incident and issued a report that
concluded that “the North Korean People’s Army violated
paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Armistice Agreement by
24

“Iraqi forces say thwart Islamist attack near Ramadi,”
Reuters, 20 May 2015, www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/
us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0O50LP20150520.

25

Forum on the Arms Trade and Stimson Center, “Tracking arms in conflict: Lessons from Syria and Iraq,” 7 April 2015, www.forumarmstrade.
org/uploads/1/9/0/8/19082495/april7_findings_final.pdf.

26

“One Tunisian soldier killed in landmine explosion near Algerian
borders,” Shanghai Daily, 2 December 2014, www.shanghaidaily.com/
article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=255987.

27

“Two soldiers killed by landmine in west Tunisia,” The Guardian,
18
August
2015,
www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/08/
two-soldiers-killed-by-landmine-in-west-tunisia/.

28

This particular type of mine has been found frequently in South Korea
and on its coastal islands. In 2010, a South Korean man was killed by
the same type of mine in the neighboring county in Gyeonggi Province.
See Landmine Monitor 2011.

29

30

“North
Korea
Rejects
Landmine
Blasts
Blame,”
Sky
News,
14
August
2015,
news.sky.com/story/1535725/
north-korea-rejects-landmine-blasts-blame.
“North Korea Ambassador’s August 21, 2015 Opening Statement at
UN Press Conference,” Scribd.com, www.scribd.com/doc/275521285/
North-Korea-Ambassador-s-August-21-2015-Opening-Statement-atUN-Press-Conference.
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emplacing wooden box land mines along a known
Republic of Korea patrol route.” According to the report,
the investigation determined that “the devices were
recently emplaced” and not “legacy landmines which
had drifted from their original placements due to rain or
shifting soil.”31

Syria
In late 2011, the first reports emerged of Syrian
government mine use in the country’s border areas.32
A Syrian official acknowledged the government had
“undertaken many measures to control the borders,
including planting mines.”33
The Islamic State, rebel groups, and the regime in
Syria continue to use IEDs and landmines, which has
led to many civilian and non-civilian deaths. These are
frequently reported as “roadside bombs,” but also
include victim-activated devices. According to the
Violations Documentation Center for Syria, there were
24 non-civilian deaths and 67 civilian deaths from
landmines between October 2014 and October 2015.34
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights also reported
67 civilian deaths from this time period from landmines,
but noted that there were 53 non-civilian deaths, and nine
unspecified individual deaths.35
Human Rights Watch reported that at least 70 mine
explosions occurred in the Tel Shair corridor along the
Syrian-Turkish border near Kobani between 15 September
and 15 November 2014, killing at least three civilians,
including two children, and injuring nine others.
Photographs taken by humanitarian workers show what
appear to be US-made M2 bounding antipersonnel
mines that were allegedly found in the minefields
north of Kobani, which lie in Turkish territory and fall
under Turkey’s obligations as a State Party to the Mine
Ban Treaty to destroy all antipersonnel landmines in
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible.36
Photographs and a video posted online by the Syrian
Center for Demining Rehabilitation on 28 September
2015, allegedly filmed west of Daraa in southern Syria,
show up to 20 PMN-4 antipersonnel mines being

31

US Forces Korea Press Release, “United Nations Command Military
Armistice Commission Investigates land mine detonation in demilitarized zone,” 13 August 2015, www.usfk.mil/Media/PressReleases/
tabid/12661/Article/613531/united-nations-command-military-armistice-commission-investigates-land-mine-det.aspx.

32

ICBL Press Release, “ICBL publicly condemns reports of Syrian forces
laying mines,” 2 November 2011, www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-andevents/news/2011/icbl-publicly-condemns-reports-of-syrian-forces-la.
aspx.

33

“Assad troops plant land mines on Syria-Lebanon border,” Haaretz, (The
AssociatedPress),1November2011,www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/
assad-troops-plant-land-mines-on-syria-lebanon-border-1.393200.

34

Violations Documentation Center in Syria, “Martyrs,” undated,
www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/martyrs.

35

Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, “Reports,” undated,
www.syriahr.com/en/category/coverages-of-observatory/reports/.

36

Human Rights Watch Press Release, “Syria/Turkey: Landmines
Kill Civilians Fleeing Kobani,” 2 December 2014, www.hrw.org/
news/2014/12/02/syria/turkey-landmines-kill-civilians-fleeing-kobani.
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removed from the ground.37 This was the first evidence
of use of the PMN-4 in the Syria conflict, but it is unclear
who laid them or when. Markings on the mines indicate
they were manufactured in Russia in 1995.
A video posted to YouTube on 12 October 2015 by
“the First Brigade,” which specializes in demining, shows
bounding antipersonnel mines as well as antivehicle
mines reportedly cleared in Daraa.38
A video released by PYD in February 2015 following
the cessation of fighting in Kobani shows victim-activated
IEDs in buildings, allegedly in Kobani.39

Myanmar
Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999,
Landmine Monitor has consistently documented the
use of antipersonnel mines by government forces and
NSAGs in many areas of Myanmar (Burma). During this
reporting period, information available to the Monitor
indicates a continuation of the trend of a significantly
lower level of new mine use.
In March 2015, the inhabitants of Pyin Soe village
in the eastern Paletwa township of Chin State, near the
border with Bangladesh, fled after they were warned by
soldiers from Light Infantry Brigade 289 not to go beyond
a stream near their village because the government
soldiers had laid mines on the other bank.40 In September
2015, Myanmar Army soldiers asked villagers to take
them to a frontline location in Momauk township at
which point the soldiers laid mines and warned them not
to return to the area.41
Antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs has apparently
decreased significantly since 2012 when many armed
groups began to engage in negotiations on a nationwide
ceasefire, which some, but not all, signed in October
2015.42 In March 2015, villagers from Pyin Soe village
reported that they saw the Arakan Army (AA) lay mines
near the edges of their village during conflict between
the AA and the Myanmar Army.43 In May 2015, the Kachin
Independence Army (KIA) sent a letter to several villages
in Mogaung township notifying them that new mines
were being laid there. In December 2014, the government
published allegations of landmine use by the KIA, and
37

“28 9 2015 ةنيدمب يقرشلا يحلا يف ماظنلا تاوق اهتعرز يتلا ماغلألا ةلازأ
اعرد فيرب,” YouTube, 28 September 2015, youtu.be/-gXJIy3Et0k.
See also, Armament Research Services, “Russian PMN-4 anti-personnel landmines in Syria,” 1 October 2015, armamentresearch.com/
russian-pmn-4-anti-personnel-landmines-in-syria/.

38

“لماعتلا و ماغلألا عزنب ةصتخم ةبيتك لوأ || ةنسلا دوسأ ةقرف || زيمم
اهعم,” YouTube, 12 October 2015, youtu.be/mncW58ni8N4.

39

"شعاد يباهرا تاخخفمو ماغلا نيب ينابوك يلاها ةايح," YouTube, 14 February 2015, www.youtube.com/watch?v=-OgzXaRfRKw

40

Chin Human Rights Organization, “Thematic Briefing: Armed conflict
in Paletwa, southern Chin State,” 15 June 2015, p. 7, www.chro.ca/
images/stories/files/PDF/ArmedConflict_Paletwa_eng.pdf.

41

Monitor interview with humanitarian organizations working with conflict-displaced communities in Kachin state, Yangon, 9 and 13 October
2015. Informants requested anonymity.

42

For more details, see ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Myanmar: Mine Ban
Policy,” 27 October 2015, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/
myanmar_burma/mine-ban-policy.aspx.

43

Chin Human Rights Organization, “Thematic Briefing: Armed conflict
in Paletwa, southern Chin State,” 15 June 2015, p. 7, www.chro.ca/
images/stories/files/PDF/ArmedConflict_Paletwa_eng.pdf.

stated that 10 people had died and 37 were injured due
to KIA-laid mines between October 2013 and November
2014.44

Libya
Reports emerged in September 2014 alleging new use
of antipersonnel mines at Tripoli International Airport,
which saw fighting in July–August between the Zintan
alliance of militia groups and forces of the Libya Dawn
Alliance.45 Antipersonnel mines were likely laid in 2014
and not earlier, but the party responsible for the use
could not be determined.46 On 29 October, Human
Rights Watch spoke by telephone with the commander
of the Misrata Revolutionaries engineering unit within
the Libya Dawn Alliance that had been responsible for
clearing landmines and other unexploded ordnance in
Tripoli since August. The commander said that on 24
August 2014, the day of the airport takeover, his unit
had discovered a mined area of the airport.47 He said a
pickup truck mounted with anti-aircraft weapons entered
the “old airport area” and detonated a mine, killing one
fighter from the Misrata Umm al-Maarek brigade and
wounding several others.

Pakistan
The government reported in March 2015 that
antipersonnel mines have been used throughout the
country and attributed responsibility for the use to
“terrorists.”48 Media reports have registered a large
number of casualties, apparently from newly laid mines,
in Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the NorthWest Frontier Province), where the Pakistan Army and
security forces have been engaged in armed conflict with
Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Baloch insurgents.

44

“Locals speak of KIA’s acts,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 8 December
2014, p. 9.

45

Video footage reportedly filmed in September at Tripoli International
Airport by Alnabaa—a private Libyan satellite TV network—and by Al
Jazeera shows the clearance of at least 20 T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines
and at least one PRB M3 antivehicle mine. Reports by both TV networks
alleged that the mines were laid by the Zintani-led forces. “MOHAMMEDNAJEM MINES IN TRIPOLI AIRPORT,” YouTube, 31 August 2014,
youtu.be/1iuDv4vwvHk?t=1m3s; and “عزنب أدبت ايبيل رجف تاوق
سلبارط راطم طيحمب ماغلألا,” YouTube, 31 August 2014, www.youtube.
com/watch?v=g1yZ1rW_vrI&feature=youtu.be&t=1m32s.

46

Human Rights Watch, “Evidence of New Landmine Use in Tripoli,” 5
November 2014, www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/04/libya-evidence-newlandmine-use-tripoli. The Zintan alliance of militia groups, a coalition of militias from the inland mountain town of Zintan, controlled
Tripoli Airport from the end of the 2011 until 24 August 2014, when
Libya Dawn Alliance of militias from the coastal city of Misrata seized
control, after five weeks of intense fighting. At the time of fighting,
a Zintani force known as the Airport Security Katiba was controlling
Tripoli Airport and its vicinity.

47

The commander informed Human Rights Watch that his unit has
found and cleared approximately 600 landmines since 24 August,
mostly T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines, from the Tripoli International
airport compound.

48

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 31 March 2015,
www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/EAD1587D68214C2AC1257E1A004707D7/$file/2015_Pakistan_NAR_APII.
pdf.
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Other reports
Additionally, reports of “landmine” use by Boko Haram
militants in the Sambisa Forest of Nigeria have been
published in the media since May 2014. For example, two
soldiers were killed and two others were injured when troops
of 5th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Brigade encountered
“landmines” buried by Boko Haram while advancing
towards Dikwa, Borno State, according to a Nigerian
Army spokesperson.49 He also said the militants converted
chemistry laboratories at the Dikwa School of Agriculture
into bomb-making factories when they seized the town.50
The Nigerian Army has released a series of photos showing
its engineers removing IEDs planted along the GwozaYamteke highway.51 The limited amount of photographs
published of the devices used by Boko Haram indicate that
they are IEDs, not factory produced landmines.
Military authorities stated to an Egyptian newspaper
that they had begun to lay landmines around military
outposts in the Sinai in May 2015.52 By October 2015,
Egypt did not respond to a letter sent by the ICBL in June
requesting clarification on the report.
In the reporting period, there were reports of NSAG
use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali,
Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen.

Largest stocks of antipersonnel mines

49

“Boko Haram Landmines Kill 2 Soldiers As Army Liberate Borno Town,”
9jainformant.net, 21 August 2015, www.9jainformant.net/2015/08/21/
boko-haram-landmines-kill-2-soldiers-as-army-liberate-borno-town/.

50

“Nigerian Army Disables Boko Haram Explosives,” Voice of America,
5
August
2015,
www.voanews.com/content/nigeria-army-disables-boko-haram-explosives/2903551.html.

51

“Bombs, IEDS & Land Mines: Nigeria Army Clear Gwoza -Yamteke
Road in Borno (Photos),” Tori.ng, 5 August 2015, www.tori.ng/
news/5950/bombs-ieds-land-mines-nigeria-army-clear-gwoza-yam.
html.

52

“New security plans to ‘entrap’ Sinai militants by landmines,” The
Cairo Post, 20 May 2015, thecairopost.youm7.com/news/151695/news/
new-security-plans-to-entrap-sinai-militants-by-landmines.

53

There is an amount of uncertainty about the method China uses to
derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel
mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which
can hold numerous individual mines.

54

For China: ICBL/Monitor interview with Ji Haojun, Deputy Director,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Col. Wu Gang, Policy Division, Ministry
of Defense, in Maputo, 24 June 2014. For the US: US Department of
Defense, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in
the Pentagon Briefing Room,” 27 June 2014, www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5455.
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26.5 million

Pakistan

estimated 6 million

India

estimated 4–5 million

China

“less than” 5 million

US

3 million

Total

45 million

States not party that may stockpile
antipersonnel mines

Global stockpiles of antipersonnel
mines
The Monitor estimates that as many as 31 of the 35 states
not party to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile landmines. In
the past, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states
not party stockpile about 160 million antipersonnel
mines. However, in 2014, China informed the Monitor
that its stockpile is “less than” five million53 and the US
confirmed that its stockpile is three million.54 Previously,
China was estimated to have stockpiled 110 million
antipersonnel mines, and the US 10.4 million. Therefore,
the global total held by states not party may now be less
than 50 million. (See Status and Operation of the Mine
Ban Treaty, further below, for details on stockpiles remaining
to be destroyed by States Parties.)

Russia

Armenia

Korea, North

Russia

Azerbaijan

Korea, South

Saudi Arabia

Bahrain

Kyrgyzstan

Singapore

China

Lao PDR

Sri Lanka

Cuba

Lebanon

Syria

Egypt

Libya

UAE

Georgia

Mongolia

US

India

Morocco

Uzbekistan

Iran

Myanmar

Vietnam

Israel

Nepal

Kazakhstan

Pakistan

It is not clear if all 31 states currently stockpile
antipersonnel mines. Officials from the United Arab
Emerates (UAE) have provided contradictory information
regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and
Morocco have stated that they have only small stockpiles,
used solely for training purposes. Three states not party,
all Pacific states, have said that they do not stockpile
antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and
Tonga. It is unclear if Palestine possesses stockpiles of
antipersonnel mines.
States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely
destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as an element
of ammunition management programs and the phasing
out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, stockpile
destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia,
Pakistan, Russia, the US, and Vietnam.

Non-state armed groups
During this reporting period, the Polisario Front in
Western Sahara reported the destruction of 3,000
stockpiled antipersonnel mines, as required by its
signature of Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment for
adherence to a Total Ban on Antipersonnel Mines and for
Cooperation in Mine Action.55
Fewer NSAGs today have access to factory-made
antipersonnel mines compared to a decade ago due
to the halt in trade and production and due to the
destruction of stockpiles under the Mine Ban Treaty.
55

Geneva Call, “Western Sahara: the Polisario Front destroys stockpiles of anti-personnel mines,” 31 March 2015, www.genevacall.org/
polisario-front-destroys-stockpiles-anti-personnel-mines/. Also email
from Geneva Call in response to request for information from Carolin
Nehme, Thematic Legal Advisor, Geneva Call, 18 June 2015.
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Some NSAGs have acquired mine stocks from former
regimes (such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria)
or removed them from minefields, but most appear to
make their own improvised mines from locally available
materials. In states not party, NSAGs have also been
known to capture antipersonnel mines, steal them from
arsenals, or purchase them from corrupt officials.
During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal
groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, Libya, Myanmar,
Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen were reported to
possess stocks of antipersonnel mines. The Monitor
largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces
or verified photographic evidence from journalists to
identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.

Production and transfer of
antipersonnel mines
More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at
some point in the past.56 A total of 40 of which have
ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including
four that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt,
Israel, Nepal, and most recently, the US.57 A majority of
major producers from the 1970s to 1990s are among
those states that have stopped manufacturing and joined
the Mine Ban Treaty.
The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of
antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar,
North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea,
and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not believed to
be actively producing mines but reserve the right to do
so. Those most likely to be actively producing are India,
Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.
NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Myanmar,
Pakistan, Syria, and Tunisia produce antipersonnel
mines, mostly in the form of victim-activated IEDs.
Between June 2014 and June 2015, Pakistan’s armed
forces state that they recovered 253 tons of explosives
and thousands of weapons during operations against
insurgents in the country.58 In 2015, the Colombian Army
continued to locate and destroy landmine assembly
facilities belonging to FARC.59

56

There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in
that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources
as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines,
Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has been a producer.

57

Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June
2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom (UK), and Zimbabwe.

58

59

Khan, H. “2,763 terrorists killed, 347 army jawans embraced martyrdom,” The International News, 14 June 2015, www.thenews.com.
pk/Todays-News-13-38028-2763-terrorists-killed-347-army-jawansembraced-martyrdom.
For example, in June 2015 an Army unit located and destroyed a cache
of 40 FARC mines in Planadas (Tolima). June 2014–June 2015 media
tracking in Colombia by Camilo Serna, CCCM, emailed to the Monitor
on 11 July 2015.

Trade in antipersonnel mines
A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel
mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This
ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the
stigma attached to the weapon. The Monitor has never
conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of
antipersonnel mines.
While the Monitor has reported for the past decade
that the global trade in antipersonnel mines had consisted
of a low level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers,
the abrupt appearance of mines in Sudan, Ukraine, and
Yemen in recent years raises the specter that some form
of market for antipersonnel mines exists.60
At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty,
including six landmine producers, have enacted formal
moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China,
India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore,
South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters have
made statements declaring that they now have stopped
exporting, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also
claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to
the contrary.61

Universalizing the ban on antipersonnel
mines
Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March
1999, states that had not signed it by then may no longer
sign and ratify the treaty but must accede, a process that
essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the
162 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while
30 acceded.62
The last to accede was Oman on 20 August 2014. No
country has joined the Mine Ban Treaty since Landmine
Monitor 2014 was published.
The 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include
the Pacific state of the Marshall Islands, which is the only
signatory yet to ratify.
The US government announced policy measures
in June and September 2014 to ban future production
and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines, accelerate
stockpile destruction, and ban their use, except on
60

In Yemen, the appearance of East German PPM-2 antipersonnel
mines suggests that a new supply channel is in place as Yemen did
not declare the type as part of its stockpile or as part of existing mine
contamination. PPM-2 antipersonnel mines are known to be present
in Somalia, across the Gulf of Aden. In Sudan, the appearance in the
past two years of significant numbers of No. 4 antipersonnel mines
with Farsi-language markings also seemingly indicates that stockpiles
of antipersonnel mines are available to the various actors engaged in
the conflict in the southern provinces of Sudan.

61

Landmine Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining
organizations in Afghanistan were clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped
1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to Landmine Monitor and the ICBL by HALO Trust,
Danish Demining Group, and other demining groups in Afghanistan.
Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

62

The 30 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban
Treaty through the process of “succession.” These two countries are
Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and
South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the 132
signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and
88 ratified afterward.
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the Korean Peninsula.63 The White House said the
new landmine policy means the US is “signaling our
clear aspiration to eventually accede to the Ottawa
Convention.”64

Annual UN General Assembly resolution
An annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution
provides an important opportunity for states outside
the Mine Ban Treaty to indicate their support for the
ban on antipersonnel mines and the objective of its
universalization. A dozen of the countries that have
acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999 did so after
voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.65
On 2 December 2014, UNGA Resolution 69/34
calling for universalization and full implementation of the
Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 164 states in
favor, none opposed, and 17 abstentions.66 The number
of affirmative votes and abstentions was slightly lower
than in 2013.67
A core of 14 states not party have abstained from
consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions since 1997: Cuba,
Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea (since
2007), Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan
(since 1999), the US, and Vietnam (since 1998).68

Non-state armed groups
Some NSAGs have expressed a willingness to observe the
ban on antipersonnel mines, which reflects the strength
of the growing international norm and stigmatization of
the weapon. At least 64 NSAGs have committed to halt
the use of antipersonnel mines over the past 12 years.69
The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs
have no permanence, and frequently split into factions,
go out of existence, or become part of state structures.

Convention on Conventional Weapons
Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on
Conventional Weapons (CCW) entered into force on 3
63

64

Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Changes to U.S.
Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy,” The White House, 23 September 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/
fact-sheet-changes-us-anti-personnel-landmine-policy.
Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Josh
Earnest en route Joint Base Andrews, 6/27/2014,” The White House,
27 June 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/27/
press-gaggle-press-secretary-josh-earnest-en-route-joint-base-andrews-62.

65

This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Estonia, Finland, FYR Macedonia, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea,
and Turkey.

66

The 17 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel,
Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

67

The resolution’s highest number of affirmative votes was 165 in favor
in 2013 and 2010, while the lowest number of votes in support was 138
in 2001.

68

Uzbekistan voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban
Treaty in 1997.

69

As of October 2014, 44 through the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 19 by self-declaration, and four by the Rebel Declaration (two
signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). See,
Geneva Call, “Deed of Commitment,” undated, www.genevacall.org/
how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/. Prior to 2000, several declarations were issued regarding the mine ban by NSAGs, some of whom
later signed the Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.
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December 1998 and regulates the production, transfer,
and use of mines, booby-traps, and other explosive
devices. The weaknesses of the original protocol and
inadequate measures to improve it through Amended
Protocol II gave impetus to the Ottawa Process that
resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. As of October 2015, a
total of 102 states were party to Amended Protocol II.
One state ratified the protocol since the publication of
Landmine Monitor 2014; Grenada on 10 December 2014.
Only 10 states that are party to Amended Protocol
II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Georgia,
India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri
Lanka, and the US. Therefore, for antipersonnel mines,
the protocol is only relevant for those 10 countries as the
rest are bound by the much higher standards of the Mine
Ban Treaty.
The original Protocol II on mines, booby-traps, and
other devices entered into force on 2 December 1983 and,
while it was largely superseded by Amended Protocol
II, there are still 11 states that are party to the original
protocol that have not ratified the amended protocol,
including Cuba, Lao PDR, Mongolia, and Uzbekistan
and Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Burundi, Djibouti,
Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Togo, and Uganda.
A total of 17 states that stockpile antipersonnel mines
are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended
Protocol II, or CCW Protocol II. Five of these states are
also landmine producers.

States that stockpile antipersonnel mines
but are not party to the CCW
Armenia

Libya

Azerbaijan

Myanmar

Bahrain

Nepal

Egypt

Saudi Arabia

Iran

Singapore

Kazakhstan

Syria

Korea, North

UAE

Kyrgyzstan

Vietnam

Lebanon
Note: Italics indicate states that also reserve the right to produce
antipersonnel mines

Status and Operation of the
Mine Ban Treaty
In general, States Parties’ implementation of and
compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent.
The core obligations have largely been respected, and
when ambiguities have arisen they have been dealt
with in a satisfactory matter. However, there are serious
compliance concerns regarding a small number of States
Parties with respect to use of antipersonnel mines and
missed stockpile destruction deadlines. In addition,
some States Parties are not doing nearly enough to
implement key provisions of the treaty, including those
concerning mine clearance and victim assistance.
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Compliance
At the Third Review Conference in June 2014, States
Parties to the convention created a new Committee on
Cooperative Compliance to consider whether a concern
about compliance with the convention’s prohibitions
contained in Article 1.1 is potentially credible and, if so,
to consider any follow-up that might be appropriate for
States Parties.70
The chair of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on
Cooperative Compliance delivered a three-page report to
the June 2015 intersessional meetings detailing its work
and preliminary observations concerning allegations or
reports of landmine use in States Parties.71 According to
the report, between September 2014 and May 2015 the
Committee met several times to consider past instances
of alleged use of antipersonnel mines and assess the
credibility of these allegations and the value of follow-up
on them. In that period it met with the representatives
of concerned States Parties Sudan, Ukraine, Turkey,
and Yemen to engage each in a cooperative dialogue
regarding allegations of use of antipersonnel mines.
The Committee did not recommend specific actions
be taken by States Parties, but will continue its work to
further follow-up on these and other allegations of use.
Following the presentation of the report, Ukraine and
Turkey addressed the allegations and Austria, Norway,
Switzerland, UNMAS, the ICRC, and the ICBL welcomed
the Committee’s work and the report’s observations.
Austria condemned any use of antipersonnel mines
by any actor and called on all States Parties concerned
to clarify outstanding allegations of use at the earliest
possible opportunity, take any necessary steps for full
compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty, and immediately
take all measures necessary to protect the civilian
population from any more harm.72

Use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties
In this reporting period, commencing in October 2014,
there has been no confirmed use of antipersonnel mines
by government forces of States Parties. Prior to Landmine
Monitor 2013, there had never been a confirmed case of
use of antipersonnel mines by the armed forces of a State
Party since the Mine Ban Treaty became law in 1999. That
70

71

72

The committee will also, “When appropriate, in close consultation with
the States Parties concerned, clarify the situation, and if as a result it
assesses that the concern is credible, make suggestions on steps that
the States Parties concerned could take to ensure that the Convention
remains strong and effective; For cases where the concern is credible,
present preliminary observations at intersessional meetings if need
be, and conclusions and recommendations at Meetings of the States
Parties or Review Conferences; Remain transparent and accountable,
including by reporting on activities at both intersessional and Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences.” “Decisions on the
Convention’s Machinery and Meetings,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 5,
www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Decisions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf.
Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative Compliance, “Activity
Report and Preliminary Observations,” June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2015-Cooperative-compliance-activity-report.pdf.
Statement of Austria, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meeting, Geneva,
26 June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/
IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_COMPLIANCE_COMMITTEE_-_
Austria.pdf.

is no longer the case since the confirmation by Yemen
that a violation of the convention by its forces occurred
in 2011.
Additionally, a number of allegations of mine use in
previous years by the armed forces of South Sudan (in
2013 and 2011), Sudan (in 2011), Turkey (from 2009), and
Cambodia/Thailand (2008 and 2009) warrant resolution
by those governments and other States Parties.

Stockpile destruction
A total of 156 of the 162 States Parties do not stockpile
antipersonnel mines, of which 90 have officially declared
completion of stockpile destruction and 65 have declared
never possessing antipersonnel mines (except in some
cases for training purposes). Tuvalu has not made
an official declaration, but is not thought to possess
antipersonnel mines.73
Finland completed the destruction of its stockpile of
one million mines on 18 August 2015 and was the only
state to conclude destruction in the reporting period.74
Six States Parties stockpile antipersonnel landmines,
including three that failed to complete the destruction of
their stockpiles by their four-year deadline:
• Oman declared a stockpile of 17,260 antipersonnel
mines of Belgian, British, and German manufacture
in its initial Article 7 transparency report provided
in August 2015.75 It has committed to destroy the
stockpile by the deadline of 1 February 2019.
• Poland signed a contract in March 2015 to destroy
its remaining stockpile of 16,597 landmines
in coordination with the NATO Support and
Procurement Agency by June 2016.76 Poland’s
stockpile destruction deadline is 1 June 2017.
• Somalia acknowledged that “large stocks are in the
hands of former militias and private individuals,”
and that it is “putting forth efforts to verify if in
fact it holds antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.”77
Somalia has not reported the destruction of any
stockpiled mines since the convention came
into force for it. Somalia's stockpile destruction
deadline is 1 October 2016.
• Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine remain in violation
of Article 4 after having failed to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline.78
73

Guinea-Bissau apparently still needs to destroy a small quantity of
antipersonnel mines that were discovered after its 1 November 2005
deadline had passed.

74

Juho Korpela, “The last anti-personnel mines destroyed,” Finnish
Defense Force, 18 August 2015, bit.ly/LM15Banf74.

75

Oman listed a stockpile of 1,556 No. 7 (UK); 12,560 PRB M409
(Belgium); and 3,144 DM31 (German) antipersonnel mines. Mine
Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, August 2015 (in Arabic, translation by
the
Monitor),
www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/
957868F552AB98BAC1257E9E0054ABAC/$file/Oman+Initial+2015.pdf.

76

Statement of Poland, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings,
Geneva, June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/
APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2f_STOCKPILE_DESTRUCTION_-_Poland.
pdf.

77

Mine Ban Treaty Initial Article 7 Report (for the period 16 April
2012 to 30 March 2013), Sections B, E, and G, www.unog.
ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/0421E458A87D2CA5C1257B4A004C41CE/$file/Somalia+2012.pdf.

78

Belarus and Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had
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Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than
49 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including
more than 530,000 destroyed in 2014.
Five States Parties collectively possess more than
nine million antipersonnel mines remaining to be
destroyed: Ukraine (5,767,600), Belarus (2,861,636),
Greece (452,695), Oman (17,260), and Poland (16,957).
The inability of Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine to
complete their stockpile destruction is a matter of deep
concern for States Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC. The
Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 calls on States Parties
that missed their deadline to comply without delay and
also to communicate their plans to do so, to request
any assistance needed, and to provide an expected
completion date. The Maputo Action Plan added a call
for these states to provide a plan for the destruction of
their remaining stockpiles by 31 December 2014.
• At the June 2015 intersessional meetings, Belarus
reported that all of its stockpiled antipersonnel
mines other than those considered to be in
an “unsafe condition” will be destroyed by 1
November 2016.79
• In a statement released 31 December 2014, Greece
stated that “it was reviewing all possible options
in an effort to adhere to its initial intention to
complete the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines by the end of 2015.”80
• At the June 2015 intersessional meetings, Ukraine
stated that PFM mines are ready to be destroyed at
the incinerator located at the Pavlograd Chemical
Plant but budgetary priority has been focused on
national defense. Ukraine expressed its willingness
for further negotiations for international funding
for the destruction of its remaining stockpile.81
It destroyed 576 PFM mines in 2014, which had
become unstable in storage and dangerous.82

Mines retained for training and research
(Article 3)
Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to
retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for
the development of and training in mine detection, mine
clearance, or mine destruction techniques…The amount
of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number
absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”
A total of 72 States Parties have reported that they
retain antipersonnel mines for training and research
purposes, of which 38 have retained more than 1,000
mines and three (Finland, Bangladesh, and Turkey)

have each retained more than 12,000 mines. Eighty-five
States Parties have declared that they do not retain any
antipersonnel mines, including 33 states that stockpiled
antipersonnel mines in the past.83 A total of 43% of
the States Parties that retain mines failed to submit an
annual transparency report for calendar year 2014, which
was due by 30 April 2015.
Due to this lack of information, it is not possible to
present a total figure of mines retained for 2014 that
would serve as a basis of meaningful comparison for
previous years.
In addition to those listed above, an additional 33
States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines and
together possess a total of 14,288 retained mines.84
Key updates from calendar year 2014 were:
• Oman submitted its initial Article 7 report,
retaining 2,000 mines.
• Australia only retains mines without detonators,
which are not defined as antipersonnel mines,
meaning it no longer retains mines.
• The number of retained mines in Denmark, Ireland,
and the United Kingdom (UK) increased.
The ICBL has expressed concern regarding the
large number of States Parties that are retaining mines
but apparently not using those mines for permitted
purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines
retained remains the same each year, indicating none are
being consumed (destroyed) during training or research
activities. No other details have been provided about how
the mines are being used. Eight States Parties have never
reported consuming any mines retained for permitted
purposes since the treaty entered into force for them:
Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria,
Senegal, and Togo.
Numerous States Parties have reported decreases
in the number of mines retained, but only a few have
explained the reductions in their transparency reports.
Among the states that reduced the number of mines
retained without explanation for calendar year 2014 were
Brazil (2,037 fewer), Greece (345), Cambodia (80), Czech
Republic (37), Slovakia (35), Spain (31), Belarus (24), and
Thailand (19).
Three States Parties increased the number of their
retained mines in the reporting period. The United
Kingdom retained an additional 353 mines, Ireland
increased by 59, and Denmark increased by 12.
While laudable for transparency, several States Parties
are still reporting as retained antipersonnel mines devices
that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or

a deadline of 1 June 2010.
79

Preliminary Observations of the President of the Fourteenth Meeting of
the States Parties, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva,
23 June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/
IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2015-Stockpile-Destruction-2f-corrected.pdf.

80

Ibid.

81

Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meeting of the Committee on
Cooperative Compliance, Geneva, 26 June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_
COMPLIANCE_COMMITTEE_Ukraine.pdf.

82

Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G, 1 April 2015, www.unog.
ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/6EFB9D23D790FA91C1257E62005235CE/$file/Ukraine+2014.pdf.
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83

No Article 7 reports for four of the remaining five States Parties could
be found: Central African Republic, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia,
and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The fifth, Tuvalu, has yet to
submit their initial Article 7 report.

84

States Parties retaining less than 1,000 mines under Article 3: Angola
(972), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), Jordan (850),
Argentina (841), Honduras (826), Mauritania (728), United Kingdom
(724), Portugal (694), Italy (624), South Africa (576), Cyprus (500),
Bhutan (490), Zimbabwe (450), Nicaragua (448), Togo (436), Slovenia (361), Congo (322), Ethiopia (303), Cote d’Ivoire (290), Lithuania
(269), Uruguay (260), Cape Verde (120), Eritrea (101), Ecuador (100),
Fiji (93), Rwanda (65), Ireland (59), Senegal (50), Benin (16), Guinea-Bissau (9), and Burundi (4).
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States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines
State

Last total
declared
(for year)

Initial
declaration

Consumed
during 2014

Year of last
declared
consumption

Total quantity
reduced as
excess to need

Finland

16,500 (2014)

16,500

0

None ever

—

Turkey

14,902 (2014)

16,000

42

2014

—

Bangladesh

12,050 (2013)

15,000

450

2013

—

Sweden

6,183 (2014)

13,948

52

2014

—

Belarus

5,998 (2014)

7,530

24

2014

—

Algeria

5,970 (2014)

15,030

0

2009

—

Greece

5,797 (2014)

7,224

345

2014

—

Croatia

5,685 (2014)

17,500

29

2014

—

Venezuela

4,874 (2011)

4,960

N/R

2010

—

Tunisia

4,670 (2014)

5,000

100

2014

—

France

3,956 (2014)

4,539

2

2014

—

Yemen

3,760 (2013)

4,000

0

2008

—

Bulgaria

3,669 (2014)

10,466

3

2014

6,446

Nigeria

3,364 (2011)

3,364

N/R

None ever

—

Brazil

3,214 (2014)

17,000

2,037

2014

—

Thailand

3,208 (2014)

15,604

19

2014

4,517

Serbia

3,149 (2014)

5,000

0

2011

1,970

Djibouti

2,996 (2004)

2,996

N/R

None ever

—

Chile

2,824 (2014)

28,647

101

2014

23,694

Cambodia

2,747 (2014)

701

80

2014

—

Belgium

2,564 (2014)

5,980

0

2013

—

Indonesia

2,454 (2013)

4,978

0

2009

2,524

Romania

2,395 (2013)

4,000

0

2013

1,500

Czech Rep.

2,264 (2014)

4,859

37

2014

—

Peru

2,015 (2014)

9,526

0

2012

7,487

Sudan

1,938 (2015)

10,000

N/R

2008

—

Oman

2,000 (2015)

2,000

N/R

None ever

—

Canada

1,909 (2014)

1,781

0

2013

—

Denmark

1,832 (2014)

4,991

0

2013

2,900

Tanzania

1,780 (2008)

1,146

N/R

2007

—

Uganda

1,764 (2011)

2,400

N/R

2003

—

Japan

1,663 (2014)

15,000

267

2014

—

Spain

1,660 (2013)

10,000

31

2014

6,000

Namibia

1,634 (2009)

9,999

N/R

2009

—

Netherlands

1,557 (2013)

4,076

0

2013

—

Slovakia

1,185 (2014)

7,000

35

2014

5,500

Germany
Kenya
Botswana
Partial Total

1,143 (2014)

3,006

737

2014

—

1,020 (2007)

3,000

N/R

2007

—

1,019 (2011)

1,019

N/R

Unclear

—

149,312

325,770

4,391

69,571

Note: N/R = not reported.

otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning
as an antipersonnel mine, including by the destruction
of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered
antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty:
• Afghanistan keeps no live landmines for its entire
stock of 2,360 retained mines.
• Australia keeps no serviceable detonators for its

entire stock of 459 retained mines.
• Canada reported it has transferred 84 mines from
Afghanistan without fuzes.
• Bosnia and Herzegovina maintains a stockpile of
983 fuzeless mines.
• Gambia reported that all of its 100 retained mines
were fuzeless.
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• Serbia reported that 1,045 of its mines were fuzeless.
• Lithuania reported it has 269 mines with
command-controlled fuzes, which are not covered
under the treaty.
• Eritrea, France, Germany, Mozambique, and
Senegal also reported that some of the mines they
retained were inert or fuzeless, or were otherwise
incapable of functioning as antipersonnel mines.
A total of 25 States Parties have over time used expanded
Form D of their annual transparency reports to voluntarily
report additional information on retained mines.85

Transparency reporting
Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State
Party “report to the Secretary General of the United
Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later
than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention
for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement
the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report
annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.
During the reporting period, October 2014 to October
2015, an initial report was submitted by Oman in August
2015. Tuvalu (due 28 August 2012) has never submitted
an initial report. As of 27 October 2015, only 41% of
States Parties had submitted annual reports for calendar
year 2014.
Of the 94 States Parties86 that have failed to meet
their most recent annual reporting obligation, 74 have
failed to submit an annual transparency report for two
or more years. Among the States Parties that did not
submit reports for 2014 are five States Parties with Article
5 clearance obligations (Ethiopia, Niger, Palau, Somalia,
and Yemen).
No state submitted a voluntary report in 2015. In
previous years, Morocco (2006, 2008–2011, and 2013),
Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Laos (2010), Mongolia
(2007), and Sri Lanka (2005) submitted voluntary
reports.

85

Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cote D’Ivoire, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Ecuador, France, Gambia, Germany, Indonesia, Iraq,
Ireland, Japan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Romania, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Zambia. Some States
Parties on this list only used some voluntary elements of Form D.

86

Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados,
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroun, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Cook
Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Djibouti, Dominican
Republic, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Jamaica,
Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco,
Namibia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niger, Niue, Palau, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Saint
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa,
São Tomé & Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, TimorLeste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda,
Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.
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rogress continues to be made in removing the
threat of antipersonnel mines. The amount of
land reported to be cleared of landmines globally in 2014 increased to 201km2, compared
to 185km2 in 2013. Twenty-eight States Parties
have completed clearance since 1999. However,
progress is slow. As few as three of the 33
States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations are on
track to meet their deadlines, even though in many cases
this should be achievable. Improvements are needed in
defining the size of the remaining antipersonnel mine contamination, reporting on survey and clearance results, and
the timeliness and quality of extension requests.

• stated that it believed that more than 200km2 of
mined area could be cleared annually, and in 2014
this was achieved.2
• Twenty-eight States Parties have completed
implementation of Article 5 since 1999.3 Burundi
announced in April 2014 that it had completed
survey and clearance of its remaining suspected
mined areas and reiterated this announcement
in June 2014. In September 2015, Mozambique
declared itself clear of antipersonnel mines.4
• Twenty-seven States Parties have requested and
received extended deadlines for clearance. In 2014,
four States Parties submitted extension requests,
all of which were approved at the third review
conference: the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DR Congo), Eritrea, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. In
2015, four states submitted extension requests
for consideration by the 14th Meeting of States
Parties, 30 November to 4 December 2015: Cyprus,
Ethiopia, Mauritania, and Senegal.
• Only three States Parties appear to be on track to
meet their Article 5 clearance deadline.

Status and Key Developments
2014–20151
• Sixty-one states and areas have an identified threat
of antipersonnel mine contamination: 33 States
Parties, 24 states not party, and four other areas. A
further five States Parties have either suspected or
residual mine contamination.
• In its initial Article 7 transparency report,
Oman declared for the first time that it has
areas suspected of being contaminated with
antipersonnel mines, and therefore has been
added to the list of contaminated States Parties.
New antipersonnel mine contamination arising in
Ukraine has resulted in it being added to the list of
contaminated States Parties.
• A total of 201km2 was reported to be cleared of
landmines in 2014, an increase from an estimated
185km2 in 2013. The total number of antipersonnel
mines reported to be destroyed was 232,000, a
decrease from 275,000 in 2013. Last year, the ICBL

1

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of Norwegian People’s
Aid (NPA), which conducted the majority of mine action research performed in 2015 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented here.

2

Landmine Monitor 2014, Mine Action chapter, p. 21.

3

In addition, El Salvador completed clearance in 1994, before the Mine
Ban Treaty was created. Jordan declared completion of clearance in
April 2012 but has found hundreds of antipersonnel mines during subsequent verification and clearance operations; it therefore still has an
obligation under Article 5.

4

In a public ceremony, Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister Oldemiro Baloi declared the country to be free of the “threat” of mines.
UNDP in Mozambique, “Mozambique declared ‘mine free,’” undated,
www.mz.undp.org/content/mozambique/en/home/ourwork/environmentandenergy/successstories/Mozambique_Declared_Mine_free/.
An email from Hans Risser, UNDP, 13 October 2015 stated that following its announcement of completing the last antipersonnel mine
clearance task on its territory in September 2015, Mozambique was
expected to make a formal declaration of compliance with its Mine Ban
Treaty Article 5 obligations and submit a report to the Article 5 Committee at the next Meeting of States Parties in December 2015. Burundi
had declared completion in November 2011 but subsequently discovered additional areas requiring clearance, and cleared those prior to its
deadline. Statement of Burundi, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, 26 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/
APMBC-RC3/thursday/13_HIGH_LEVEL_SEGMENT_-_Burundi.pdf.

Curious children look
over an armored
tractor with rotary
mine comb safely
parked in the Gulan
refugee camp,
Khost province,
Afghanistan.
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Estimated extent of mine contamination
Sub-Saharan
Africa

Americas

East and South
Asia, and
Pacific

Europe, the
Caucasus, and
Central Asia

Middle East and
North Africa

Azerbaijan
Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH)
Croatia
Turkey

Iraq
Western Sahara

More than 100 km2
Angola
Chad

Afghanistan
Cambodia
Thailand

20–99 km2
Eritrea
South Sudan
Zimbabwe

Algeria
Lebanon
Yemen

South Korea
Sri Lanka
5–19 km2

Sudan
Somaliland

Argentina*
Chile

Armenia
Tajikistan
United Kingdom*
Less than 5 km2

DR Congo
Niger
Senegal

Ecuador
Peru

Serbia
Kosovo

Jordan
Palestine

Cyprus**
Georgia***
Kyrgyzstan
Russia
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
NagornoKarabakh****

Egypt
Iran
Israel
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Syria

No estimate provided
Ethiopia
Mauritania
Somalia

Colombia
Cuba

China
India
Lao PDR
Myanmar
North Korea
Pakistan
Vietnam

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics.
*Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.
**Cyprus states that no minefields remain under Cypriot control.
***The known area in Georgia is small, but there may be mined areas in South Ossetia.
****The known area in Nagorno-Karabakh is small, but that estimate is believed to only include contamination within the Soviet-era
boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh, and not mine contamination in the adjacent territories.

Mine Contamination in 2014
It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the
total area contaminated by landmines due to a lack of
data. Estimates of the size of contaminated areas have
tended to be exaggerated as a result of poor surveys.
However, global understanding of the scale of the
problem is gradually improving each year, particularly
among States Parties, as they make increased use of land
release methodologies to cancel suspected hazardous
areas (SHAs) by non-technical survey, and reduce
confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) through technical
survey. No estimate of the size of contamination exists
for seven States Parties, 18 states not party, and one
other area, which are known to be contaminated (for
further details of the estimated extent of antipersonnel
mine contamination, please see the Mine Action country
profiles at www.the-monitor.org).
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Prior to 2014, Ukraine did not report any mine
contamination under Article 5, as the scope of any
residual mine problem it had was not known. In 2014, new
contamination was reported in Ukraine and in a number
of other states that were already contaminated (for details
please see the Ban Policy chapter of this publication).
Five
States
Parties
have
residual
or
suspected
contamination:
Djibouti,5
Moldova,6
5

Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and
France declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area in
Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be
mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea in June 2008. Djibouti has not made
a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

6

Moldova, which had an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, made a statement in June 2008 that suggested it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of
Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction. However,
this statement was later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC_june08/
Speeches-GS/SCGS-Universalization-2June08-Moldova-en.pdf.
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Programs clearing the largest amount of mined area in 2014
State

Mined
area cleared
(km2)

Antipersonnel
mines
destroyed

Notes

Afghanistan

62.87

12,517

Major discrepancies between
the Article 7 report and datafrom the mine action center

Cambodia

54.38

20,479

Substantial inconsistencies
in data, and discrepancies
between the Article 7 report
and data from the mine action
center

Croatia

37.75

1,842

Algeria

6.4

42,428

Iraq

5.58

16,734

Azerbaijan

4.76

42

Sri Lanka

3.75

32,223

Mozambique

3.07

45,681

South Sudan

2.62

880

2.6
183.78

2,676
175,502

17.19

56,307

200.97

231,809

Angola
Sub-totals
Other programs combined
Total global clearance

Major discrepancies between
data provided by mine action
centers and operators

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.

Namibia,7 Palau,8 and the Philippines.9 These States
Parties have an obligation to make “every effort” to
identify mined areas under their jurisdiction or control
that contain antipersonnel mines and then to clear any
that they find. In cases where they are unable to complete
this work within their Article 5 deadline, they must
request an extension in order to remain in compliance
with the treaty.

Mine Clearance in 2014
Total global clearance of landmines in 2014 was
estimated to be 201km2, with 232,000 antipersonnel
mines and 11,500 antivehicle mines destroyed. This
represents an increase from 185km2 of total area cleared
in 2013, although a decrease from the destruction of
approximately 275,000 antipersonnel mines.

7

Despite a statement by Namibia given at the Second Review Conference that it was in full compliance with Article 5, questions remain as to
whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for example
in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.

8

Palau submitted an Article 7 report in 2011 in which it declared for the
first time that it had areas containing antipersonnel mines on its territory. In its 2012 Article 7 report, Palau reported suspected contamination in the Umubrogol Mountains (on Bloody Nose Ridge). In May
2013, Palau reported that two mine clearance operators were working
in Palau to clear unexploded ordnance, including land and sea mines,
but that it faced a “bottle neck from the government permitting bodies
due to lack of Standard Operating Procedures and the technical knowledge to review and approve clearance methodologies.”

9

The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by nonstate armed groups over recent years, has not formally reported the
presence of mined areas.

Ten countries comprised three-quarters of all
reported clearance efforts in 2014. However, in three of
these countries, there were substantial inconsistencies
between data sources in reported areas cleared. Many
states do not report on clearance, therefore this total
figure is intentionally conservative and understates the
extent of clearance.

Mine clearance in 2010–2014 (km2)
Year

Mined area
cleared

Antipersonnel
mines
destroyed

Antivehicle
mines
destroyed

2014

201

231,708

11,500

2013

185

275,000

4,500

2012

200

240,000

9,300

2011

190

325,000

29,900

2010

200

388,000

27,000

Total

976

1,479,708

82,200

Five of the 10 most contaminated States Parties do
not appear in the table above. Four of these states—
BiH, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe—had low rates of
clearance in 2014, ranging from 0.15km2 to 1.85km2, while
Chad did not report on the amount of land cleared.
No clearance figures were reported in 2014 for the
following States Parties: Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Senegal,
and Ukraine. Clearance was not reported in the following
states not party: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Lao
PDR, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia,
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South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Egypt
and Morocco reported very high clearance figures, but
provided no further details, therefore those figures have
not been included in the total global clearance figure.

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5
Obligations
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties
are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as
possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party
to the treaty. States Parties that consider themselves
unable to complete their mine clearance obligations
within the deadline may submit a request for a deadline
extension of up to 10 years.

Completion of Article 5 implementation
Twenty-eight States Parties, one state not party, and one
other area have completed clearance since the treaty
entered into force in 1999. Burundi, which had reported
additional suspected mined areas after declaring
completion of its Article 5 obligations in 2011, announced
that its subsequent survey and clearance efforts in 2014
had been completed.10 Mozambique declared completion
of its Article 5 obligations in September 2015.11 However,
because Mozambique had not requested an additional
extension to its deadline of 1 January 2015, for eight
months Mozambique was in violation of the Mine Ban
Treaty. Montenegro has still formally to report completion
of its Article 5 obligations.

State Parties that have completed Article 5
implementation since 1999
Albania

Germany

Nigeria

Bhutan

Greece

Rwanda

Bulgaria

Guatemala

Suriname

Burundi

Guinea-Bissau

Swaziland

Congo

Honduras

Tunisia

Costa Rica

Hungary

Uganda

Denmark

Malawi

Venezuela

France

Montenegro

Zâmbia

FYR Macedonia

Mozambique

Gambia

Nicaragua

In addition, state not party Nepal and other area
Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas
since 1999. El Salvador, a State Party, completed clearance
in 1994, before the Mine Ban Treaty was created.
10

11

Statement of Burundi, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, 26
June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/
thursday/13_HIGH_LEVEL_SEGMENT_-_Burundi.pdf
In a public ceremony, Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister Oldemiro Baloi declared the country to be free of the “threat” of mines.
UNDP in Mozambique, “Mozambique declared ‘mine free,’” undated,
www.mz.undp.org/content/mozambique/en/home/ourwork/environmentandenergy/successstories/Mozambique_Declared_Mine_free/.
An email from Hans Risser, UNDP, 13 October 2015 stated that
following its announcement of completing the last antipersonnel mine
clearance task on its territory in September 2015, Mozambique was
expected to make a formal declaration of compliance with its Mine Ban
Treaty Article 5 obligations and submit a report to the Article 5 Committee at the next Meeting of States Parties in December 2015.
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Progress on meeting deadlines
As of November 2015, only three States Parties are on
track to meet their clearance deadlines, while 20 are not
on track, and the status of three is unclear. Four States
Parties are awaiting approval of their extension requests
submitted in 2015. Two States Parties have missed their
deadlines.
The assessments of the status of each States Party
regarding the fulfilment of their Article 5 obligations are
made through consideration of several factors including
the deadline date, the remaining challenge and the
extent to which it is known, clearance rates, mine action
capacity and assets, funding prospects, and the existence
of any conflict and insecurity problems.12
Four States Parties submitted extension requests that
were approved at the Third Review Conference in June
2014:13
• DR Congo requested a six-year extension period to
conduct non-technical and technical surveys and
clearance in order to complete its obligations.14 In
granting DR Congo’s second extension request,
States Parties called on DR Congo to present a
detailed workplan by 30 April 2015. However, in
June 2015 DR Congo informed States Parties that
due to funding difficulties it was unable to submit
a workplan until the next meeting of States Parties
in December 2015.15
• Eritrea’s extension request sought a further five
years to continue clearance and complete resurvey
of SHAs, but not to fulfil its clearance obligations
under the treaty. In granting the extension request,
States Parties noted that five additional years
beyond Eritrea’s previous February 2015 deadline
“appeared to be a long period of time to meet this
objective.”16
• Yemen’s second extension request acknowledged
that it was largely “based on speculation,”17 and
operations in 2014 in fact fell well short of the
extension request target of clearing 1.6km2 a year,
hampered by insecurity and by an acute shortage
of funds.
• Zimbabwe’s three-year extension request was
to enable further survey and clearance, but not
to complete its clearance obligations within
the requested period. Zimbabwe undertook “to
12

The status assessments were made by NPA, and the Monitor concurs
with these conclusions.

13

APLC/CONF/2014/CRP.1, Final Draft Document, Mine Ban Treaty
Third Review Conference, 27 June 2014, pp. 6–10, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Final-report-Jun2014.pdf.

14

Analysis of DR Congo’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for
extensions, 18 June 2014, p. 5.

15

Statement of DR Congo, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings,
Standing Committee on Article 5 Implementation Matters, Geneva, 25
June 2015.

16

Decision on the Eritrea Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted
by the President of the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference,
Maputo, 26 June 2014.

17

Second Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17
December 2013, p. 15.
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States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations, their deadlines, and status of any
deadline extensions
States Parties

Original deadline

Extension period

Deadline

Status

Afghanistan

1 March 2013

10 years

1 March 2023

Not on track

Algeria

1 April 2012

5 years

1 April 2017

On track

Angola

1 January 2013

5 years

1 January 2018

Not on track

Argentina

1 March 2010

10 years

1 March 2020

No change since extension
requested

BiH

1 March 2009

10 years

1 March 2019

Not on track

Cambodia

1 January 2010

10 years

1 January 2020

Not on track

Chad

1 November 2009

14 months (1st extn.) 1 January 2020
3 years (2nd extn.)
6 years (3rd extn.)

Not on track

Chile

1 March 2012

8 years

1 March 2020

On track

Colombia

1 March 2011

10 years

1 March 2021

Not on track

Croatia

1 March 2009

10 years

1 March 2019

Not on track

Cyprus

1 July 2013

3 years
Second extension
request submitted
in 2015

1 July 2016

Extension requested to 1 July
2019

DR Congo

1 November 2012

26 months (1st extn.) 1 January 2021
6 years (2nd extn.)

On track

Ecuador

1 October 2009

8 years

1 October 2017

Not on track

Eritrea

1 February 2012

3 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)

1 February 2020

Not on track

Ethiopia

1 June 2015

5 year request submitted in 2015 after
missing deadline

Iraq

1 February 2018

N/A

Jordan

1 May 2009

3 years

1 May 2012

Should submit extension
request*

Mauritania

1 January 2011

5 years
Second extension
request for five years
submitted in 2015

1 January 2016

Extension requested to 1
January 2021

Niger

1 September 2009

N/A**

31 December 2015

Not on track. Intends to
submit a second extension
request in 2015

Oman

1 February 2025

Peru

1 March 2009

8 years

1 March 2017

Not on track

Senegal

1 March 2009

7 years
Second extension
request for five years
submitted in 2015

1 March 2016

Extension requested to 1
March 2021

Serbia

1 March 2014

5 years

1 March 2019

Unclear

Somalia

1 October 2022

N/A

Not on track

South Sudan

9 July 2021

N/A

Not on track

Sudan

1 April 2014

5 years

1 April 2019

Not on track

Tajikistan

1 April 2010

10 years

1 April 2020

Unclear

Thailand

1 May 2009

9.5 years

1 November 2018

Not on track

Turkey

1 March 2014

8 years

1 March 2022

Not on track

Ukraine

1 June 2016

N/A

United Kingdom

1 March 2009

10 years

In violation of Mine Ban
Treaty. Extension requested to
31 May 2020
Not on track

No assessment at this point

Unclear
1 March 2019

Not on track
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States Parties

Original deadline

Extension period

Deadline

Status

Yemen

1 March 2009

6 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)

1 March 2020

Not on track

Zimbabwe

1 March 2009

22 months (1st extn.) 1 January 2018
2 years (2nd extn.)
2 years (3rd extn.)
3 years (4th extn.)

Not on track

*Jordan formally declared completion of clearance at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in 2012. However, given Jordan’s recognition that
it still has suspected hazardous areas, it has outstanding Article 5 obligations to fulfil, and should submit an extension request.
** Niger’s first extension request was granted in accordance with a procedure for mined areas discovered after the expiration of a state’s Article 5 deadline.
N/A = not applicable.

clarify the remaining challenge, understand what
progress will be possible once partners operate
at full capacity and once additional support has
been identified, produce a detailed plan, and
submit a subsequent request for fulfilment of its
Article 5 obligations.”18 In granting the request,
States Parties stated that Zimbabwe had not
complied with the principal commitment it made
under previous extension requests “to garner an
understanding of the true remaining extent of
the challenge and to develop plans.” They noted
the progress made toward building capacity and
increasing efficiency by engaging support from
international organizations.19
Four States Parties submitted extension requests in
2015 for approval at the 14th meeting of States Parties, to
be held 30 November–4 December 2015:
• Cyprus submitted a second request on 27 March
2015, for a further three-year extension, until 1 July
2019. The reason cited for the second extension
request was the same as the first request, namely
that Cyprus does not have effective control over
remaining contaminated areas.20
• Ethiopia is in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty
for missing its 1 June 2015 clearance deadline,
a situation that could have been avoided by
accelerating progress in previous years or by
requesting an extended deadline in 2014, as per
the process agreed at the Seventh Meeting of
States Parties. Ethiopia submitted a request on
15 June 2015 for an extension of five years until 1
June 2020 to complete survey and clearance of
all remaining mined areas.21 Ethiopia’s extension
request contains a number of inconsistences and
errors. The Committee on Article 5 Implementation
therefore asked for clarification of several points,
and a response was provided on 26 October 2015.
• Mauritania submitted an extension request in
April 2015 because of suspected contamination
on the border with the area of Western Sahara, in
locations where border demarcation needs to be
18

Decision on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Mine
Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014.

19

Ibid.

20

Second Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27
March 2015.

21

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p.
10.
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clarified. In its request for a second extension, up
to 1 January 2021, the Mauritanian government
said it would enter into a dialogue with “all of the
stakeholders in the Western Sahara conflict so
as to be in a position to clarify the status of the
suspected areas.”22
• Senegal’s latest Article 5 deadline extension
request submitted in June 2015 included plans for
survey and clearance in 2016–2020, but did not
specify how developments in peace discussions
were expected to impact clearance, how the armed
forces would be involved in the clearance process,
or how resources would be mobilized.23
Niger announced in June 2015 that it would submit a
second extension request which, as of 8 November 2015,
has yet to be submitted.
Funding shortages have been cited as an impediment
to fulfilling Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations by
or for approximately one-third of States Parties with
outstanding obligations. Several of these states are also
experiencing conflict or security problems that contribute
to the lack of donor support. Conflict and security
problems are reported to severely affect implementation
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, and
Yemen. In the following countries, insecurity is reported
to hamper land release efforts in specific geographical
areas: Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Jordan,
Thailand, and Turkey.
However, many of the States Parties that have
requested extensions, or are not on track to meet their
deadlines, are not facing such constraints. The Cartagena
Action Plan adopted at the Second Review Conference
in 2009 stated that extensions should only be needed
“due to exceptional circumstances.”24 Despite this, by
November 2015, of the 33 States Parties with outstanding
clearance obligations, 28 have requested deadline
extensions, eight of which have requested extensions
at least twice. The ICBL has called on States Parties
to act with greater urgency in fulfilling their clearance
obligations.25
22

Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 April
2015, p. 4.

23

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015, p. 28.

24

“Cartagena Action Plan 200-2014: Ending the Suffering Caused by
Anti-Personnel Mines,” 11 December 2009, p. 4, www.cartagenasummit.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC2/2RC-ActionPlanFINAL-UNOFFICIAL-11Dec2009.pdf.

25

See for example ICBL, Statement on Clearance, Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, 24 June 2014, icbl.org/media/1466485/
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Many of those States Parties with extended deadlines
in place are making only limited progress, as the table
above indicates. Moreover, many have not provided
clear plans on how they intend to meet their clearance
obligations within their deadlines. The Committee on
Article 5 Implementation observed that of the “States
Parties that are in the process of implementing Article
5, few have reported that they have a plan to complete
implementation of Article 5, some have plans that extend
beyond their deadlines and many have not indicated that
they have plans leading up to their deadlines.”26

Monitoring the progress of States Parties
against their Article 5 obligations and the
Maputo Action Plan

while Ethiopia and Senegal missed the submission
deadline by more than 15 months and 2.5 months
respectively. One state announced its intention to
submit a request that has still not been made public as
of 8 November 2015 (Niger). The requests prepared by
Ethiopia and Senegal lacked the consistency, accuracy,
and comprehensiveness that would characterize highquality requests.
As of 1 November 2015, Article 7 transparency reports
for 2014 were still outstanding for eight states with
contamination: Angola, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Niger, Senegal, Somalia, and Yemen. Maputo Action
Plan Action #25 calls for the annual submission of highquality and updated information.

The Maputo Action Plan was adopted at the Third Review
Conference on 27 June 2014. Actions 8, 9, and 11 relate
to clearance, and States Parties agreed to “commit to
intensify their efforts to complete their respective timebound obligations with the urgency that the completion
work requires.”27
The Committee on Article 5 Implementation was
established by the Third Review Conference, replacing
the Standing Committee on Mine Action.28 Its purpose
is to “intensify efforts, particularly those outlined in
the Maputo Action Plan, to ensure that Article 5 is fully
implemented as soon as possible, while acknowledging
local, national and regional circumstances in its practical
implementation.” It also analyzes each request for an
Article 5 extended deadline. It presented its preliminary
observations on Article 5 implementation on 23 June
2015, reporting on 16 of the 18 States Parties that had
submitted information by that date.29
With regard to Maputo Action Plan Action
#8 (quantification and qualification of remaining
contamination challenge), the Committee assessed the
degree of clarity of the remaining challenge, finding
that only four of the 16 States Parties had provided a
high degree of clarity: Afghanistan, Ecuador, Sudan, and
Thailand.
In assessing Maputo Action Plan Action #9
(application of land release methodologies), the
Committee called on States Parties to align their national
mine action standards with the revised International
Mine Action Standards (IMAS) if they have not already
done so.
Maputo Action Plan Action #11 calls for on-time
submission of high-quality requests. In 2015, two states
submitted on-time requests (Cyprus and Mauritania),
icbl-3rc-statement-on-clearance.pdf.
26

Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 23 June 2015, p. 4, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/
APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2014-Preliminary_observations-Art5.
pdf.

27

Maputo Action Plan, 27 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/
fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Maputo-action-plan-adopted-27Jun2014.
pdf.

28

Draft Final Document, 27 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.
org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Final-report-Jun2014.pdf.

29

Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 23 June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/
IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2014-Preliminary_observations-Art5.pdf.
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Casualties and Victim Assistance
© Loren Persi/ICBL-CMC, May 2015

1

2

Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor
global mine/ERW casualty data. Casualties occurring during a cluster
munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are reported
in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information
on casualties caused by cluster munitions, see ICBL-CMC, Cluster
Munition Monitor 2015, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/cluster-munition-monitor-2015/casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx.
Security forces include police and representatives of non-state armed
groups.

3 	

The percentage of civilian casualties was 79% in 2013, 81% in 2012,
and 70% in 2011. Since 2005, civilians have represented approximately 73% of casualties for which the civilian status was known.
From 1999–2003, the percentage of civilian casualties averaged 81%
per year.

4

In 1999, the Monitor identified 9,220 mine/ERW casualties. Given
significant improvements in data collection since 1999, with a higher
proportion of casualties now being recorded, the decrease in casualties is likely even more significant.

Number of mine/ERW casualties per
year (1999–2014)
Number of casualties per year

L

andmines, victim-activated improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), cluster munition remnants,1 and
other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—henceforth mines/ERW—remain a significant indiscriminate threat.
For 2014, the Monitor recorded 3,678 mine/
ERW casualties marking a 12% increase from
2013. The percentage of civilian casualties, as compared
to military and security forces,2 was 80% in 2014 (where
the civil status was known), almost identical to 2013.3
Despite ongoing casualties and the significant
increase compared to 2013, 2014 still had the second
lowest annual total of mine/ERW casualties recorded
since 1999. There has been an overall trend of
progressively fewer casualties since the Mine Ban Treaty
entered into force 1999.
There were an average of 10 casualties per day in 2014,
whereas in 1999 there was more than one mine/ERW
casualty occurring each hour on average.4 Yet the total
global number of casualties continues to grow each year.
Over 96,000 mine/ERW casualties have been recorded
by the Monitor since its global tracking in began in 1999.

Year

Cumulative total of mine/ERW casualties
5
recorded 1999–2014

Casualties

Casualties

Albania’s victim assistance
focal point Veri Dogjani
(right), a qualified medical
doctor, discusses emergency
response with NPA medical
team in the field.

Year
5 	

Figures include individuals killed or injured in incidents involving devices
detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle,
such as all antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and victim-activated
IEDs. AXO and UXO, including cluster munition remnants, are collectively referred to as ERW. Cluster munition casualties are also disaggregated and reported as distinct from ERW where possible. Not included
in the totals are: estimates of casualties where exact numbers were not
given, incidents caused or reasonably suspected to have been caused
by remotely-detonated mines or IEDs (those that were not victim-activated), and people killed or injured while manufacturing or emplacing
devices. For more details on casualty figures or sources of casualty
data by country or area, see country profiles on the Monitor website,
www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles.aspx.
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Casualties in 2014
Of the total of 3,678 mine/ERW casualties the Monitor
recorded for 2014, at least 1,243 people were killed and
another 2,386 people were injured; for 49 casualties it
was not known if the person survived.6 The Monitor
recorded 3,308 casualties in 2013. In many states and
areas, numerous casualties go unrecorded; therefore,
the true casualty figure is likely significantly higher.
The data collected by the Monitor is the most
comprehensive and widely used annual dataset of
casualties caused by mines/ERW.7 Casualties were
identified in a total of 58 states and other areas in 2014.8
Of the total casualties in 2014, 70% (2,593) occurred
among States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.9
In 2014, there were far more victim-activated IED
casualties in Afghanistan (809, compared to 567 in
2013), as well as a smaller increase in casualties caused
by ERW (430, compared to 399 in 2013). In Mali, there
was a jump in the number of mine casualties, thought to
be due to antivehicle mines (92 in 2014, compared with
31 in 2013). In addition, victim-activated IED casualties
were recorded in Mali for the first time (16).10 In both
Chad and Cambodia, the numbers of casualties from
landmines, antivehicle mines, and ERW all increased
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6

This is among the lowest number of unknowns since Monitor
recording began in 1999.

7

For the year 2014, the Monitor collected casualty data from 25 different national or UN mine action centers. The Monitor also collected
data on casualties from various mine clearance operators and victim
assistance service providers, as well as from a range of national and
international media sources. Mine action centers registered 835 of the
3,678 casualties identified in 2014. The Monitor identified 591 mine/
ERW casualties in 2014 through the media that had not been collected
via official data-collection mechanisms. The majority of these casualties occurred in countries without any data-collection mechanism.

8

The Monitor first recorded 72 states in which mine/ERW casualties
were identified in 1999.

9

Casualties were identified in the following 37 States Parties to the
Mine Ban Treaty in 2014: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola,
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DR
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait,
Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

10

The remainder of the increase for Mali was casualties caused by
ERW: 33 in 2014, up from 21 in 2013. The number of casualties from
unknown devices declined: 3 in 2014, down from 16 in 2013.
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compared to 2013.11 One factor influencing the increased
number of casualties reported in Myanmar appeared to
have been more extensive data collection, with a larger
number of organizations engaged and reporting on the
landmine issue.

States with 100 or more recorded
casualties in 2014
States
Afghanistan

No. of casualties
1,296

Colombia

286

Myanmar

251

Pakistan

233

Syria

174

Cambodia

154

Mali

144

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty indicated in bold

However, it must be stressed that, as in previous
years, the 3,678 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2014
only include recorded casualties. Due to incomplete data
collection at the national level, the true casualty total is
certainly higher. Based on the updated Monitor research
methodology in place since 2009, it is estimated that there
are up to approximately 1,000 additional casualties (25–
30%) each year that are not captured in its global mine/
ERW casualty statistics, with most occurring in severely
affected countries and those experiencing conflict. The
level of underreporting has declined over time as many
countries have initiated and improved casualty datacollection mechanisms and the sharing of this data.
In 2014, however, the number of casualties missed in
national annual reporting is expected to be higher than
average with more than 1,000 casualties (1,200–1,500),
including many casualties from recently emplaced IEDs
and booby traps in Iraq and Syria, yet to be accurately
recorded. Some media reports quoted sources that said
there had been hundreds of such casualties.12
Yet the 2014 estimate is a significant drop from the
estimated total in 1999, when the monitor identified
some 9,000 casualties, with another 7,000–13,000
annual casualties estimated as unrecorded.
Some significant country-level decreases in casualty
totals in 2014 were likely due in part to conflict and
insecurity reducing the possibility of data collection.
In Yemen, reported casualties decreased from 55 in
2013 to 24 in 2014, significantly reduced from a peak
of 263 in 2012. In Syria, a state not party to the Mine
Ban Treaty that had seen a significant increase in mine/
ERW casualties in 2013, casualty recording was reported
11

For Chad the following casualties were reported: 46 via unspecified
mine types in 2014, and 20 in 2013; 20 antipersonnel mine in 2014,
and none (differentiated) in 2013; and 13 ERW in 2014, and none (differentiated) in 2013. Cambodia reported the following casualties: 37
via antipersonnel mine in 2014, and 25 in 2013; 35 antivehicle mine in
2014, and 24 in 2013; 81 ERW in 2014, and 60 in 2013. The remaining
casualties in Cambodia were from unexploded submunitions, one in
2014, and three in 2013.

12

However, it was often not clearly reported whether devices were
victim-activated.
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to have been seriously hindered by the deteriorating
security situation in 2014. Syria had 174 recorded
casualties in 2014, compared to 201 in 2013. Just 19
casualties were recorded for Ukraine in 2014, although
other reporting implied that there were hundreds of
mine/ERW casualties through 2014 and into 2015, but
the reports lacked sufficient detail to be included in the
Monitor data set.
Fluctuations in annual casualties recorded in Angola
(11 in 2014, 71 in 2013, and 34 in 2012) and in Iraq (64 in
2014, 124 in 2013, and 84 in 2012) are attributable to a
lack of a reliable collection mechanism for casualty data
in those countries. This causes variability in casualty
totals and makes trends difficult to discern, as noted
in the previous Landmine Monitor report. In addition,
while data collection within Iran is thought to be quite
complete, it has not been made available to the Monitor
consistently. Consequently, the casualty data was often
compiled from various sources, as was the case for 2014.

Mine/ERW incidents impact not only the direct
casualties—the boys, girls, women, and men who were
killed, as well as the survivors18—but also members
of their families struggling under new physical,
psychological, and economic pressures. As in previous
years, there was no substantial data available on the
numbers of those people indirectly impacted as a result
of mine/ERW casualties.
In 2014, the percentage of female casualties among
all casualties for which the sex was known was 12% (378
of 3,234). This was the same percentage as in 2012 and
in 2013.19

Mine/ERW casualties by sex in 201420

Female
12%

Casualty demographics13
There were 1,038 child casualties in 2014, continuing
minor annual decreases from 1,112 in 2013 and 1,272 in
2012. Child casualties in 2014 accounted for 39% of all
civilian casualties for whom the age was known.14 Since
the Monitor began recording casualties in 1999, there
has been an average of 31% child casualties among all
casualties from mines/ERW.15
As in previous years, in 2014 the vast majority of child
casualties where the sex was known were boys (81%).16
There were 561 child casualties in Afghanistan in 2014,
representing nearly half (46%) of all civilian casualties in
that country where the age was known. It also constitutes
over half (54%) of all child casualties recorded globally
in 2014.
For more information on child casualties and
assistance see the annual Monitor fact sheet on
Landmines/ERW and Children.

Mine/ERW casualties by age in 201417

Children
39%

Male
88%
Between 1999 and 2014, the Monitor identified more
than 1,600 deminers who were killed or injured while
undertaking clearance operations to ensure the safety of
civilian populations.21 In 2014, there were 53 casualties
identified among deminers (five deminers were killed
and 48 injured) in 10 states,22 a significant decrease in
the number of demining casualties in the preceding two
years: 85 in 2013, and 132 in 2012. It was also about half
of the average of 105 casualties among deminers per year
since 1999.
In 2014, the highest numbers of casualties among
deminers were in Iran (17), Afghanistan (16), and Lebanon
(six). Together, these three countries represented almost
75% of all deminer casualties globally in 2014. The
17 deminer casualties in Iran continued the trend of
declining casualties among deminers since 2012; 687
deminer casualties have been identified in Iran since
2006.23 Demining casualties in Afghanistan have been
18

A survivor is a person who was injured by mines/ERW and lived.

19

For 444 casualties the sex was not known.

20

This includes only the casualties for which the sex was known.

21

There were 1,623 casualties among deminers from 1999 through
2014. Since 1999, the annual number of demining casualties identified has fluctuated widely, making it difficult to discern trends. Most
major fluctuations have been related to the exceptional availability or
unavailability of deminer casualty data from a particular country in any
given year and therefore cannot be correlated to substantive changes
in operating procedures, in international demining standards, or
demining equipment.

22

Casualties among deminers occurred in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Iran, Lebanon, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Thailand,
Zimbabwe, and Somaliland.

23

No data on deminer casualties in Iran prior to 2006 was available to
the Monitor for inclusion in this report. Even based on partial data,
Iran exceeded all countries in the total number of demining casualties
since 1999. Afghanistan, with the second highest number of deminer
casualties, has recorded 491 since 1999.

Adults
61%
13

The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status
of mine/ERW casualties, to the extent that data is available and
disaggregated.

14

Child casualties are defined as all casualties where the victim is less
than 18-years of age at the time of the incident.

15

The Monitor identified more than 1,500 child casualties in 1999, and
more than 1,600 in 2001.

16

The sex of 33 child casualties was not recorded.

17

This includes only the civilian casualties for which the age was known.
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moderately consistent, with 18 casualties identified in
2013 and 16 in 2012.

Mine/ERW casualties by civilian/military
status in 201424

Security
Forces
18%
Civilians
80%
Deminers
2%
Civilian casualties represented 80% of casualties
where the civilian/military status was known (2,833 of
3,528).
The country with the most annual military casualties
continued to be Colombia, with 187 in 2014. Mali, with 84
military casualties (including peacekeeping forces), was
the next highest. The third highest number in 2014 was in
Pakistan, with 75 military casualties, followed by Algeria
(54) and Syria (52).

27% in 2013).27 The percentage of casualties from victimactivated IEDs that act as antipersonnel mines increased
significantly (up to 31%, from 22% in 2013). Afghanistan
saw a large increase in the number of annual victimactivated IED casualties: 809 in 2014, from 567 in 2013,
but less than the peak of 987 in 2012. This accounted for
most of the increase in victim-activated IED casualties in
2014 globally.
In 2014, casualties from victim-activated IEDs were
identified in nine states.28 Starting in 2008, the Monitor
began identifying more casualties from these improvised
antipersonnel mines, likely due in part to an increase in their
use and also to improved data collection that made it possible
to better discern between factory-made antipersonnel mines
and victim-activated IEDs, and between command-detonated
IEDs and victim-activated IEDs.
In 2014, antivehicle mines killed and injured 218
people in 17 states and other areas, or 6% of casualties
for which the device was known.29 The states with
the greatest numbers of casualties from antivehicle
mines were Pakistan (64) and Cambodia (35). In 2013,
antivehicle mines similarly caused 212 casualties, or 7%
of casualties for which the device was known.
In 2014, 31% of casualties were caused by ERW in 41
states and areas, similar to the 34% recorded in 2013 and
31% of casualties in 2012.30

Victim-activated weapons and other
explosive items causing casualties

Number of casualties

Casualties by type of explosive device in
201425

In 2014, factory-made antipersonnel mines and victimactivated IEDs acting as antipersonnel mines caused
the majority of all casualties (49% combined).26 The
percentage of total casualties from factory-made
antipersonnel mines decreased (18% in 2014, down from
24

This includes only the casualties for which the civilian/military status
was known.

25

This includes only the casualties for which the device type was known.
The number of cluster submunition casualties was incomplete
because casualties were not differentiated from other ERW casualties.

26

Calculated for casualties for which the specific type of victim-activated
explosive item was known.
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In 2014, there were casualties from factory-made antipersonnel
mines in 26 states and areas: Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, India,
Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan,
Peru, Senegal, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Zimbabwe
and three other areas: Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western
Sahara.

28

Afghanistan, Algeria, India, Mali, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, Thailand, and Tunisia.

29

In 2014, casualties from antivehicle mines were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Morocco, Myanmar,
Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and two other
areas: Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara.

30

In 2014, casualties from ERW were identified in the following states:
Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Côte d’Ivoire,
Croatia, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, Poland,
Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand,
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia, and two other areas: Kosovo and
Somaliland. In addition to other types of ERW, casualties of unexploded submunitions were identified in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq,
Kosovo, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, South Sudan, Syria, and Vietnam.
For more information on casualties caused by unexploded submunitions and the annual increase in those casualties recorded for the
year 2014, see ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2015, www.
the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/cluster-munition-monitor-2015/
casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx.
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States/areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2014
Sub-Saharan
Africa

Americas

East and South
Asia, and Pacific

Europe, the
Caucasus, and
Central Asia

Middle East and
North Africa

Angola
Chad
Congo, DR
Côte d’Ivoire
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Senegal
Somalia
South Sudan
Sudan
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Somaliland

Colombia
Peru

Afghanistan
Cambodia
India
Lao PDR
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vietnam

Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Croatia
Poland
Russian Federation
Serbia
Tajikistan
Turkey
Ukraine
Kosovo
Nagorno-Karabakh

Algeria
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Palestine
Syria
Yemen
Western Sahara

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold, other areas in italics
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Victim Assistance

T

his overview reports on the annual status of
coordination and planning efforts designed to
improve access to services and programs for
survivors of landmine and explosive remnants
of war (ERW) for the year 2014, with updates
into 2015 when possible. It covers the activities
and achievements in 31 States Parties to the
Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine/ERW
victims in need of assistance. It particularly assesses
victim assistance in the context of the treaty’s Maputo
Action Plan (2014–2019).31 It also looks at the role of survivors in decision-making and other relevant matters of
concern.
The Mine Ban Treaty is the first disarmament
or humanitarian law treaty in which States Parties
committed to provide “assistance for the care and
rehabilitation, including the social and economic
reintegration” of those people harmed by a specific type
of weapon.32 Victim assistance, in practice, addresses the
overlapping and interconnected needs of persons with
disabilities, including survivors33 of landmines, cluster
munitions, ERW, and other weapons, as well as people
in their communities with similar requirements for
assistance.
In addition, some victim assistance efforts reach
family members and other people who have been killed
or who have suffered trauma, loss, or other harm due
to mines/ERW. All of these people are considered “mine
victims” according to the accepted definition of the term,
which includes survivors as well as affected families and
communities—although victim assistance efforts have
mainly been limited to survivors to date.
The Monitor has tracked the progress of programs
and activities that benefit mine/ERW survivors, families,
and communities under the Mine Ban Treaty and its
subsequent five-year action plans since 1999.
In June 2014 at the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review
31

32

33

This corresponds with Actions 12-18 of the Maputo Action Plan. The
Monitor reports on the following 31 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties
in which there are significant numbers of survivors: Afghanistan,
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burundi,
Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DR
Congo), Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq,
Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia,
South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen,
and Zimbabwe. This list includes 29 States Parties that have indicated
that they have significant numbers of survivors for which they must
provide care as well as Algeria and Turkey, which have both reported
hundreds or thousands of survivors in their official landmine clearance deadline (Mine Ban Treaty Article 5) extension request submissions. Algeria, Mine Ban Mine Ban Treaty Revised Article 5 Extension
Request, 31 March 2011, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/
pdf/other_languages/french/MBC/clearing-mined-areas/art5_extensions/countries/Algeria-ExtRequest-Revised-17Aug2011-fr.pdf;
and
Turkey, Mine Ban Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, 28
March 2013, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/
clearing-mined-areas/art5_extensions/countries/Turkey-ExtRequest-Received-29Mar2013.pdf.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production,
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,
(Mine Ban Treaty) Article 6.3, www.apminebanconvention.org/
overview-and-convention-text/.
A “survivor” is a person who was injured by mines/ERW and lived.
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Conference in Maputo, all States Parties committed to the
Maputo Action Plan, which includes a set of actions that
would advance victim assistance through to 2019.34 In
order to replace the previous victim assistance standing
committee, in Maputo States Parties also agreed to the
formation of a new Committee on Victim Assistance that
will “support States Parties in their national efforts to
strengthen and advance victim assistance.”35
Despite years of financial shortages that reduced
the availability of actual services, victim assistance
efforts have remained vibrant. A wide range of activities
demonstrated the continued will of States Parties, the
UN, NGOs, and above all survivors’ own networks and
representative organizations to “tangibly contribute,
to the full, equal and effective participation of mine
victims in society,” even when confronted with limited
resources.36
As shown by the many successful practices and
activities, victim assistance is not inherently complicated.
However, many challenges remain to ensure access
to sustainable services, to remove the barriers to the
full participation of survivors in their societies, and to
create actual improvements in their wellbeing. It will
require active cooperation and stronger determination to
overcome these challenges.
At a symposium on the Maputo Action Plan’s victim
assistance commitments, held by Thailand in Bangkok
in June 2015, the ICBL highlighted that, in carrying out
the plan, States Parties can apply the many years of
training and capacity-building already provided during
the life of the convention, including on improving
planning, monitoring, and evaluation.37 The ICBL also
noted that a minimum level of clear and measurable
objectives is needed. This was also highlighted in
the evaluation of a multi-million dollar World Bankfunded rehabilitation system from the early days of
victim assistance. In response to inadequate reporting
on project achievements, the evaluation found that
“a simple monitoring system focused upon a few key
variables relating project outputs to intended outcomes
would have sufficed.”38
The Maputo Action Plan provides a framework that
allows States Parties to qualitatively assess progress in
34

“Maputo Action Plan,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Maputo-action-plan-adopted-27Jun2014.pdf.

35

“Decisions on the Convention’s Machinery and Meetings,” Maputo,
27 June 2014, p. 5, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/
APMBC-RC3/3RC-Decisions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf.

36

Maputo Action Plan, Action #13. Until the Mine Ban Treaty Third
Review Conference in 2014 there had been a Standing Committee on
Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, which was originally titled the Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance,
Socio-Economic Reintegration, and Mine Awareness.

37

“Victim Assistance & the Framework of Maputo Action Plan,” Presentation of ICBL, Bangkok, 15 June 2015.

38

Word Bank, Independent Evaluation Group, “Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review - War Victims Project,” 12
December 1999, http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/
InterLandingPagesByUNID/8525682E0068603785256913006EF367.
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Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with significant numbers of survivors and needs
Sub-Saharan
Africa

Americas

East and South
Asia, and Pacific

Europe, the
Caucasus, and
Central Asia

Middle East and
North Africa

Angola
Burundi
Chad
Congo, DR
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Guinea-Bissau
Mozambique
Senegal
Somalia
South Sudan
Sudan
Uganda
Zimbabwe

Colombia
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Peru

Afghanistan
Cambodia
Thailand

Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Croatia
Serbia
Tajikistan
Turkey

Algeria
Iraq
Jordan
Yemen

victim assistance, which they can attribute to the relevant
actions that they take, even in the absence of existing
measurable baselines. It calls for activities addressing
the specific needs of victims while also emphasizing the
necessity of simultaneously integrating victim assistance
into other frameworks by incorporating relevant actions
into the appropriate sectors, including disability, health,
social welfare, education, employment, development, and
poverty reduction.39 States Parties commit to addressing
victim assistance objectives “with the same precision
and intensity as for other aims of the Convention.”40
The relevant content of the action points of the
Maputo Action Plan, can be summarized as follows:
• Assess the needs; evaluate the availability and
gaps in services; support efforts to make referrals
to existing services.
• Enhance plans, policies, and legal frameworks.
• Ensure the inclusion and full and active
participation of mine victims and their
representative organizations in all matters that
affect them; enhance capacity.
• Increase the availability of and accessibility to
services, opportunities, and social protection
measures; strengthen local capacities and enhance
coordination.
• Address the needs and guarantee rights in an ageand gender-sensitive manner.
• Communicate time-bound and measurable
objectives annually and report on measurable
improvements in advance of the next Review
Conference.
The Maputo Action Plan also affirms the need for
States Parties to continue carrying out the actions of
the previous five-year plan, the Cartagena Action Plan.
The Cartagena Action Plan stressed the importance
of the accessibility of services and information as
well as the inclusion and participation of victims,
particularly survivors, in all aspects of the treaty and its
39

Actions #12 to #18 of the Maputo Action Plan.

40

“Maputo Action Plan,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 3.

implementation. It emphasized that with regards to the
assistance provided, there should be no discrimination
against mine/ERW victims, among mine/ERW victims,
nor between survivors with disabilities and other persons
with disabilities.41

Assessing the needs
States Parties should assess needs for victim assistance—
including through sex- and age-disaggregated data—and
gauge the availability of services required. They should
also use this opportunity to offer referrals to existing
services.42 43
Needs assessment methods were improving and
were increasingly linked to the provision of services in
States Parties in Southeast Asia. However, much more
needed to be done in Afghanistan to improve data
collection.
• In Afghanistan, no specific needs assessment
surveys of mine/ERW survivors were conducted in
2014, but the relevant ministry registered persons
with war-related disabilities and the dependents
of persons killed in conflict in order for them to
receive a monthly social security allowance. An
independent assessment by the national corruption
watch body reported that the registration practices
were seriously flawed and that the social security
registration system required a massive overhaul.
• In Cambodia, the national survivors’ network in
partnership with the national mine action authority
continued to conduct a large-scale survey on the
quality of life for mine/ERW survivors and persons
with disabilities. Data gathered was used to provide
referrals, to enable follow-up, to address specific
health, income-generating and educational needs,
41

“Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014: Ending the Suffering Caused
by Anti-Personnel Mines,” Cartagena, 11 December 2009 (hereafter
referred to as the “Cartagena Action Plan”).

42

According to Action #12 of the Maputo Action Plan.

43

Country profiles are available on the Monitor website providing more
details on all countries highlighted in this chapter, www.the-monitor.
org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles.aspx.
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as well as to provide emergency food for those
people in the most difficult situations.
• In Thailand, the relevant government agencies
improved interagency coordination for the
registration of new mine/ERW casualties, as well
as follow-up for assistance and support. The
national mine action center made follow-up visits
and provided small emergency funds for the urgent
needs of some survivors.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, needs assessments
were geographically localized and survivor surveys
progressively covered affected areas in several countries:
• In Angola, the national survey for identifying and
registering mine/ERW survivors with disabilities
and assessing needs had covered half of all 18
provinces in the country as of the end of 2014.
• In Burundi, the national mine action authority
(DAHMI)44 in collaboration with Handicap
International (HI) identified survivors and
assessed needs in three (Makamba, Rutana, and
Ruyigi) of its 17 provinces.
• In Eritrea, the relevant government ministry and
UNICEF carried out “mini assessments” during
field monitoring activities.
• In Sudan, the UN continued to work with disabled
persons’ organizations (DPOs) and social workers
to identify the needs of mine/ERW survivors
through individual case studies. This information
was shared with the relevant ministry and the
national mine action center.
• In Uganda, the national network of NGOs, called
the Uganda Landmine Survivors Association
(ULSA), undertook a mine/ERW survivor needs
assessment in the remote Yumbe District.
Surveys that also enhanced survivors’ links with
state-provided services were reported in the Americas:
• In Colombia, from mid-2014 the national mine
action authority (DAICMA)45 conducted a survey
on the demographic, socio-economic, and
cultural conditions of mine/ERW survivors, while
informing them on how to register for services
and benefits through the state process. Survey
coverage increased.
• In El Salvador, the state-run Protection Fund
held roundtable consultations with survivors’
associations on survivors’ needs and made
individual visits to provide legal support and links
to assistance.
• In Peru, the mine action center CONTRAMINAS46
verified and updated information on mine/ERW
survivors and their needs. It also visited the remote
regions of Junín and Huancavelica to update
information on registered survivors, provide
medical assistance, and identify mine survivors
who remained unregistered.
44

Direction de l’Action Humanitaire contre les Mines et Engins non
explosés.

45

Dirección para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal.

46

Centro Peruano de Accion Contra las Minas Anti-Personal.
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Progress in compiling data through assessment,
although incomplete, was ongoing and making some
progress in several countries in Europe:
• In Albania, an assessment of socio-economic and
medical needs of marginalized ERW survivors was
conducted in eight affected regions in 2013–2014
with the support of local government and branches
of the national association of persons with workrelated disabilities.
• Croatia progressed in the development of a unified
database on casualties of mines/ERW and their
families, with agreements made between relevant
departments and agencies, a specific working group
established, a dedicated staff member employed,
and a combined database established. However,
in 2015, there were insufficient funds to follow up
with needs assessment in the field. The working
group sought new approaches to implementing
the needs survey, which was designed to inform
the development of projects that would address
the needs of survivors and their communities.
• In Serbia, the Ministry responsible for victim
assistance announced plans to establish a database
of members of disabled persons’ organizations,
to be updated regularly on the current needs of
individuals.
• Turkey continued to monitor and report on
survivors receiving care through the military
medical system in 2014. In 2015, the national mine
ban campaign in cooperation with the national
disability association were collecting data on
survivors in refugee camps in eastern Turkey.
In the Middle East and North Africa there was notably
increased sharing and use of casualty data from recent
surveys, in addition to some ongoing data collection:
• In Algeria, data from HI’s 2012 survivor
identification process was used in the development
of the new victim assistance action plan (March
2014) and in the implementation of economic
inclusion projects for mine/ERW survivors and
persons with disabilities, funded by the relevant
government ministry and the European Union.
• In Iraq, the national mine action authority based
in Bagdad continued mine/ERW survivor survey
efforts in 2014 and into 2015. A Basrah province
survey was ongoing in 2015, to be completed in
2016. It provided data and information on needs
from the national survey and assessment to the
relevant ministries. Mine action authorities also
exchanged survivor information with the health
ministry’s national injury surveillance system.
• In Yemen, a significant number of mine/ERW survivors
were registered in Abyan in 2013, while in 2014 some
additional survivors were registered during the course
of a victim assistance team conducting medical
examinations and providing support.
Additionally, questions about disability, which were
also relevant to survivors, were included in preparations
for upcoming national censuses in El Salvador, Ethiopia,
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and Uganda. This was encouraged and supported by
survivor’s organizations. In Peru, the national disability
council (CONADIS),47 a member of the national Victim
Assistance Consultative Committee, was also working on
a disability census.

Enhancing plans, policies, and legal
frameworks
Coordination
States Parties committed to enhancing coordination
activities in order to increase the availability and

Status of victim assistance efforts in 2014/2015
State Party

Coordination
(collaborative or combined
with disability)

Plan for assistance

Survivor participation
(in coordination)

Afghanistan

Yes (collaborative)

Yes

No (expired)

Albania

Yes (collaborative)

Yes

Yes

Algeria

Yes (collaborative)

Yes

Draft victim assistance
plan pending endorsement

Angola

Yes (collaborative)

Yes

Yes

Bosnia and Herzegovina

No (inactive)*

N/A*

Yes

Burundi

Yes (collaborative)

Yes

Yes (inactive)

Cambodia

Yes (combined)

Yes

Yes (disability plan)

Chad

No (ad hoc meetings)

N/A (ad hoc meetings)

Yes (inactive)

Colombia

Yes (collaborative)

Yes

Yes

Congo, DR

No

N/A

No (component of mine
action strategy)*

Croatia

Yes (collaborative)

Yes

Yes

El Salvador

Yes (collaborative)

Yes

Yes (disability plan)

Eritrea

No

N/A

No

Ethiopia

Yes (combined)

Yes

Yes (disability plan)

Guinea-Bissau

No

N/A

Yes

Iraq

No

N/A (ad hoc meetings)

No

Jordan

Yes (collaborative)

Yes

Yes

Mozambique

Yes (combined)

Yes

Yes (disability plan), draft
victim assistance plan
pending endorsement

Nicaragua

No

N/A

No

Peru

Yes (collaborative)

Yes

Yes

Senegal

No

N/A (ad hoc meetings)

Yes

Serbia

No

N/A (ad hoc meetings)

No

Somalia

No

N/A

No

South Sudan

Yes (combined)

Yes

No (component of mine
action strategy)

Sudan

Yes (collaborative)

Yes

No (expired)

Tajikistan

Yes (combined)

Yes

Yes

Thailand

Yes (collaborative)

Yes (ad hoc meetings)

Yes

Turkey

No

N/A

No

Uganda

Yes (combined), but
inactive*

N/A

Yes (victim assistance
plan expired end 2014)*

Yemen

Yes (no collaboration)
Inactive in 2015*

No
Inactive in 2015*

Yes (inactive)

Zimbabwe

No

N/A

No

Note: Changes since Landmine Monitor 2014 marked with *. N/A = There was no active coordination mechanism in which survivors could
participate. Ad hoc meetings = While there was no active coordination mechanism, survivors and their representative organizations met with
relevant government authorities.
47

Consejo Nacional para la Integración de la Persona con Discapacidad.
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accessibility of services that are relevant to mine
victims.48 In 2014 and into 2015, 18 of the 31 States Parties
had active victim assistance coordination mechanisms
or disability coordination mechanisms that considered
the issues relating to mine/ERW survivors’ needs.49
In Iraq, Senegal, Serbia, and Thailand there were no
official multi-sectorial coordination meetings, but ad hoc
meetings continued to take place during 2014. In the
Kurdistan region of Iraq, coordination was hampered
by significant funding capacity constraints. A victim
assistance coordination mechanism was established in
Serbia in early 2015. Ad hoc victim assistance meetings
also began in Chad, taking place during 2014. In Somalia,
a victim assistance and disability working group met for
the first time in May 2014 and was intended to meet
quarterly, but no meetings have taken place since.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), victim assistance
coordination was put on hold in early 2014. The
coordination mechanism for victim assistance in DR
Congo was dissolved in 2013, and the closure of the
UNMAS office in Kinshasa in 2014 saw coordination
moved to the physical rehabilitation-focused cluster on
disability (led by the World Health Organization, WHO),
where victim assistance issues were not specifically
addressed. In South Sudan, the victim assistance and
disability working group held only one meeting between
September 2014 and June 2015 due to funding difficulties.
Previously, it was reported to have held monthly meetings.
There were no meetings of the intersectoral disability
committee responsible for victim assistance coordination
in Uganda in 2014; meetings had becoming increasingly
less frequent since 2013, also due to a lack of funding. In
Yemen, coordination ceased due to armed conflict in 2015,
not long after having been reactivated in 2013.
Among the 18 States Parties with active victim
assistance coordination in 2014, all the national
coordination mechanisms were reported to have either
collaborated with, or been included as part of, an
active disability coordination mechanism. In six States
Parties, the designated national coordination body for
victim assistance continued to also be the coordination
mechanism for disability issues into 2015.50

survivors.51 Plans in Burundi, Chad, and Yemen remained
on hold, due to either a lack of resources and/or armed
conflict.
Actions to respond to the needs of mine survivors
had been incorporated into the national disability plans
in Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, and South Sudan,
although these states did not have a distinct victim
assistance plan. Algeria and Mozambique had developed
victim assistance plans, which were pending official
approval. Colombia, Peru, and Tajikistan had both a
national victim assistance plan and disability plans and
policies that take into account the needs and rights of
mine/ERW survivors.52
In June 2014, Serbia announced that it had initiated
the development of a national victim assistance plan
through the newly forming working group on victim
assistance.

Availability of and accessibility to services
Action #15 of the Maputo Action Plan commits States
Parties to “increase availability of and accessibility to
appropriate comprehensive rehabilitation services,
economic inclusion opportunities and social protection
measures…including expanding quality services in rural
and remote areas and paying particular attention to
vulnerable groups.”
Updates on the availability and accessibility of
comprehensive rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors
and other persons with disabilities are included in a
separate report produced by the Monitor.53 This report,
“Equal Basis 2015: Inclusion and Rights in 33 Countries,”
presents progress in the relevant States Parties to the
Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions54
in the context of the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities.
The Monitor website includes detailed country
profiles discerning progress in victim assistance in some
70 countries, including both States Parties and states
not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on
Cluster Munitions.55

51

Albania, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia,
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru,
Senegal, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen. States with
no plan: Afghanistan, DR Congo, Eritrea, Iraq, Nicaragua, Serbia,
Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, and Zimbabwe.

52

In Colombia and El Salvador, planning of mine/ERW victim assistance
was also integrated into efforts to address the needs of armed conflict
victims more generally.

53

See also, ICBL-CMC, “Equal Basis 2014: Access and Rights in 33
Countries,” 12 December 2014, www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/
news/2014/equal-basis-2014-access-and-rights-in-33-countries.aspx.

54

The 31 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties detailed here, plus Lao PDR
and Lebanon (States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions),
with significant numbers of cluster munition, landmine, and ERW
victims. The "Equal Basis 2015" report is scheduled for publication in
December 2015.

55

Country profiles are available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles.aspx. Findings specific
to victim assistance in states and other areas with victims of cluster
munitions are available through Landmine Monitor 2015’s companion
publication; ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2015 (Geneva:
ICBL-CMC, August 2015), www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/
cluster-munition-monitor-2015.aspx.

Plans and objectives
Actions #13 and #14 of the Maputo Action Plan call
on States Parties to have time-bound and measurable
objectives to implement national policies and plans
that will tangibly contribute to the main goals of victim
assistance.
In 2014, of the 31 States Parties with significant
numbers of survivors, 19 had plans with objectives that
address the needs and promote the rights of mines
48

According to the ongoing Cartagena Action Plan victim assistance
commitments and supported by Action #15 of the Maputo Action Plan.

49

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia,
Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South
Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Yemen. States with no known
or no active coordination mechanism for victim assistance in 2014:
BiH, Chad, DR Congo, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Nicaragua,
Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

50

Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Sudan, Tajikistan, and
Uganda.
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Full and active participation
Action #16 of the Maputo Action Plan commits States
Parties to ensure the “full and active participation of
mine victims and their representative organizations in all
matters that affect them.”
Mine/ERW survivors’ representatives were members
of most existing victim assistance coordination
mechanisms. However, there remains a long way to go
for survivors to be effectively included in coordination
roles in a way that their input is listened to, understood,
and acted upon with tangible measures in the context
of the design and implementation of victim assistance
objectives. Most States Parties are yet to demonstrate
that they are doing their utmost to enhance the capacity
of survivors for their effective participation, or to specify
the methods that they are using to build that capacity.
Among the 18 States Parties with active victim
assistance coordination during 2014, all but one (Yemen)
included survivors in these mechanisms. However, in
many cases there remained a need to build the capacity
of survivors’ representatives and raise awareness in the
coordination bodies in order for inclusion to be fuller and
participation more active.
Mine/ERW survivors also participated actively in
Mine Ban Treaty and other disarmament and disability
rights coordination and campaigning, as well as in
matters of peacemaking and peace-building in many
countries, including in Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Serbia,
Senegal, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda. In Colombia,
members of National Network of Landmine Victims and
Survivors’ Organizations, formed in December 2013,
represented the perspectives of mine/ERW survivors in
the Colombian peace process national committee, as
well as at the peace negotiations in Havana, Cuba in 2015.
The strong involvement of female mine/ERW
survivors in peace issues was evident in the Director
of the Uganda Landmine Survivors Association—who
is also an ICBL Ambassador—joining the 2014 Women
Peace Makers Program of the Joan B. Kroc Institute for
Peace and Justice at the University of San Diego (US).
A female survivor leader from Thailand also participated
in a seminar at the UN in New York in July 2014, as part
of Thailand’s efforts to promote the women, peace,
and security agenda associated with Security Council
Resolution 1325.
In the majority of the 31 States Parties, survivors
continued to be involved in implementing many aspects
of victim assistance, including physical rehabilitation,
peer support and referral, income-generating projects,
and needs assessment data collection.56

Communicating objectives and reporting
improvements

States Parties reported progress similarly to the way they
had in past years, by including a mix of casualty data,
updates on victim assistance services provided, and
occasionally information on laws and policies. While
more than half of the most-affected 31 States Parties
had included some information on victim assistance
activities in their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports
covering calendar year 2014,57 no States Parties had
reported directly on their time-bound and measurable
objectives by the ambitiously narrow timeframe of 30
April 2015, as specified in Maputo Action Plan Action
#13. However, according to the plan, the objectives
should be updated, their implementation monitored, and
progress reported annually. Each year, “enhancements”
to plans, policies, and legal frameworks and budgets
for the implementation of those plans, policies, and
legal frameworks should also be reported. By the next
reporting period, States Parties with significant numbers
of survivors and needs for assistance will have less than
four years to adopt and apply an adequate reporting
method for indicating that their efforts have improved the
well-being and guaranteed rights of survivors, families,
and communities before the next Review Conference.

Gender considerations
The Maputo Action Plan speaks of “the imperative to
address the needs and guarantee the rights of mine
victims, in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.”58 While
men and boys are the majority of reported casualties,
women and girls may be disproportionally disadvantaged
as a result of mine/ERW incidents and suffer multiple
forms of discrimination as survivors. To guide a rightsbased approach to victim assistance for women and girls,
States Parties can apply the principles of the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW). Implementation of CEDAW by States
Parties to that convention should ensure the rights of
women and girls and protect them from discrimination
and exploitation.59 The Committee of CEDAW General
Recommendation 30 on women in conflict prevention,
conflict, and post-conflict situations and General
Recommendation 27 on older women and protection of
their human rights, are also particularly applicable.
Some States Parties have begun to address gender
issues, often with assistance from the NGO Gender and
Mine Action Programme. For example, in 2014, the Mine
Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan developed
and adopted a Gender Mainstreaming Strategy for 2014–
2016 (including victim assistance) and established focal
points and an implementation working group.
57

The States Parties that provided some updates on victim assistance
were: Afghanistan, Albania, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia,
Croatia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. Sudan reported that it did not have any
victim assistance activities due to a lack of funding, and Thailand
reported on a one-time event.
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Maputo Action Plan Action #17.

59

As of 1 June 2015, CEDAW had 189 States Parties. Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
New York, 18 December 1979, treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.
aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-8&chapter=4&lang=en.

After 15 years of Mine Ban Treaty reporting, there was
no agreed format for victim assistance reporting. Many
56

Participation in service and program implementation was reported in
at least the following 26 States Parties: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria,
Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Croatia,
El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal,
Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.
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Casualties and Victim Assistance

Age considerations
Children, and in particular boys, are one of the largest
groups of casualties and survivors. Child survivors have
specific and additional needs in all aspects of assistance.
Incremental progress in addressing the specific needs
of child survivors was reported in some domains of
assistance, particularly psychosocial support and
education. The annually updated Monitor fact sheet on
the Impact of Mines/ERW on Children contains more
details on issues pertaining to children, youths, and
adolescents.

Special issues of concern: displacement,
conflict, and humanitarian emergencies
This Monitor reporting period was marked by growing
numbers of refugees and displaced persons resulting
from conflict, as well as by the impact of conflict and
natural disasters gravely affecting victim assistance
efforts in a number of States Parties. During natural
disasters, humanitarian emergencies, and times of
armed conflict or occupation, mine/ERW survivors face
heighted challenges to having their rights respected
and fulfilled, as well as increased barriers to accessing
adequate and appropriate services60.
In October 2015, flash rains and massive floods
destroyed houses and infrastructure in the Sahrawi
refugee camps where hundreds of survivors live with little
outside support. The camps are situated near Tindouf in
Algeria, near Western Sahara. Earlier in 2015, the World
Food Programme in Algeria had to reduce the number
of essential food items distributed to Sahrawi refugees,
including mine/ERW survivors, by 20%. UN agencies
present in the camps were jointly advocating for the most
basic needs of these refugees to be covered and not to
be forgotten.61
In 2014, catastrophic flooding in BiH and Serbia
affected a significant number of landmine survivors
and their families, some of whom lost their homes and
other resources. About half of all known survivors in BiH
were reported to be in flood-affected areas. The flooding
disrupted victim assistance activities in both countries.
In Serbia, floods caused both the state and many local
NGOs to re-prioritize their programming to focus on
relief for flood victims. This caused a general reduction in
services and programs for Serbian mine/ERW survivors,
as funds were diverted for emergency relief. During relief
efforts, media statements by the mine action center of
BiH urged special attention to the needs of mine/ERW
survivors. In Serbia, survivors also participated in relief
efforts, including by distributing food and water, and the
survivors’ organizations reallocated project funding to
60

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Landmines/ERW, Refugees, and Displacement,” 20 June 2015,” www.the-monitor.org/
media/2034850/MonitorBriefingPaper_Refugees_20June2015_
final2.pdf; and “Victim Assistance and CRPD Article 11: Situations
of risk and humanitarian emergencies,” 25 June 2015, www.the-monitor.org/media/2034853/MonitorBriefingPaper_VAandArticle11_
25June2015.pdf.

61

World Food Programme, “UN Agencies In Algeria Urge Continued
Food Assistance To Refugees From Western Sahara,” 25 February
2015, www.wfp.org/news/news-release/un-agencies-algeria-urge-continued-food-assistance-refugees-western-sahara.
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assist those most affected.
The conflict in Syria has caused a massive
displacement crisis. Refugee host countries, principally
Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq,
as well as Lebanon (a State Party to the Convention on
Cluster Munitions), have received large numbers of
persons who have fled Syria. While all these host countries
have victim assistance commitments and obligations,
the influx of refugees created additional challenges
in providing assistance and access to services for
landmine survivors and other refugees with disabilities.
In Iraq, healthcare centers and hospitals in the Kurdistan
region were overwhelmed by the number of refugees in
need entering from Syria during 2014, especially when
combined with the increase in internal displacement. In
Jordan, wounded Syrians received immediate medical
care and humanitarian organizations provided some
psychological support and rehabilitation services for warinjured persons. In Turkey, initial emergency medical care
is provided locally, but the costs of physical rehabilitation,
mobility aids, and plastic surgery were not covered by
government services, and the availability of these relied
on non-governmental and international organizations.
Conflict, insecurity, and armed violence severely
disrupted the availability and delivery of services in
South Sudan. This was also reported to be the case in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen in 2014 and 2015.

Support for Mine Action

Support for Mine Action
© HALO Trust, April 2014

A

rticle 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on international cooperation and assistance recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and
receive assistance from other States Parties
in fulfilling its treaty obligations. While this
chapter focuses on financial support for
mine action by affected countries and on
international mine action assistance reported by donor
states for calendar year 2014, cooperation and assistance
is not only limited to financial assistance. Other forms
of assistance can include the provision of equipment,
expertise, and personnel as well as the exchange of experience, know-how, and best-practice sharing.

of all international funding with $301.8 million.
• The top five recipient states—Afghanistan, Lao
PDR, Iraq, Angola, and Cambodia—received 45%
of all international contributions.
• Support to mine action activities in Afghanistan
dropped considerably, from $67.5 million in 2013
to $49.3 million in 2014, although it was still 30%
higher than funding received by the second largest
recipient (Lao PDR: $37.3 million).
• International funding was distributed among the
following sectors: clearance and risk education
(68% of all funding), victim assistance (7%),
advocacy (5%), capacity-building (4%), and
stockpile destruction (less than 1%). The remaining
16% was not disaggregated by the donors.
• The Monitor identified 13 affected states that
provided $193.6 million in contributions to their
own national mine action programs, $7 million
less than in 2013 (a 4% decrease), when 18 affected
countries reported contributing $201 million.

Key Figures

1

This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs for calendar year 2014, as of November
2015. All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed in current
dollars. Mine action support includes funding related to landmines,
cluster munitions, and unexploded ordnance, but is rarely disaggregated. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level of detail
and some utilize a fiscal year other than the calendar year.

2

Support for mine action in 2013 has been recalculated from that
reported in Landmine Monitor 2014. The Monitor now reports $640.8
million in total support in 2013, instead of $647 million.

International Contributions
in 2014
In 2014, 33 donors contributed $416.8 million in
international support for mine action. This represents a
decrease of $23 million (5%) from the $440 million reported

International support for mine action: 2004–2014

US$ (millions)

• Thirty-three donors and 13 affected states reported
contributing approximately US$610.4 million in
international and national support for mine action
in 2014;1 $30.4 million less than in 2013 (a 5%
decrease).2
• International contributions accounted for 68%
of overall support for mine action in 2014, while
states’ contributions to their own national mine
action programs accounted for the remaining 32%
of global funding.
• Donors contributed $416.8 million in international
support for mine action to 42 affected states and
three other areas. This represents a decrease of
$23 million from 2013 (a 5% decrease).
• Contributions from the top five donors—the United
States (US), the European Union (EU), Japan,
Norway, and the Netherlands—accounted for 72%

Deminer excavates
toward an
antipersonnel mine
in Angola.

Years
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Contributions by donors: 2010–2014*
Donor
US
EU
Japan
Norway
Netherlands
Switzerland
Germany
United Kingdom (UK)
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Canada
New Zealand
Australia
Ireland
Belgium
Italy
Luxembourg
France
Spain
Other donors**
Total

2014
118.1
66.8
49.1
41.8
25.9
18.1
17.5
13.1
12.1
8.0
7.8
7.7
7.5
6.6
4.5
3.2
2.2
1.5
1.3
1.1
2.9
416.8

Contribution (US$ million)
2013
2012
2011
113.9
134.4
131.4
38.5
60.7
19.3
64.0
57.6
43.0
49.6
48.4
53.4
23.4
24.1
21.3
20.6
18.4
17.5
22.1
23.8
23.6
22.8
22.0
18.0
9.3
8.7
9.3
7.7
7.2
7.4
12.9
14.1
12.2
7.9
6.8
17.0
6.7
5.4
4.3
14.5
24.0
45.7
4.1
3.6
4.0
3.1
7.2
8.1
1.5
2.8
3.4
1.9
1.2
1.2
2.1
2.0
1.3
1.6
1.9
5.3
11.6
23.2
21.0
439.8
497.5
467.7

2010
129.6
49.8
46.8
50.3
22.8
15.7
23.4
16.3
10.2
6.7
13.0
30.1
3.3
24.4
4.5
11.9
4.0
0.9
3.6
5.4
7.7
480.4

Total
627.4
235.1
260.5
243.5
117.5
90.3
110.4
92.2
49.6
37.0
60.0
69.5
27.2
115.2
20.7
33.5
13.9
6.7
10.3
15.3
66.4
2,302.2

* The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand.
** Other donors in 2014 included: Andorra, Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, South
Korea, Turkey, the Common Humanitarian Fund (Sudan), the OPEC Fund for International Development, and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Each contributed less than $1 million.

in 2013. Support went to 42 affected states and three other
areas (down from 47 states and three areas in 2013) with
$58 million not earmarked for any specific country.
While this is the second year in a row that international
assistance to mine action has declined, it has totaled more
than $400 million for the ninth consecutive year. It is too
early to speak of a continuing downward trend, but the
Monitor will continue to closely follow future developments.
Over the past five years (2010–2014), international
support totaled $2.3 billion, an average of $460 million
per year. Three donors—the US, Japan, and Norway—
contributed $1.1 billion, almost 50% of total international
support. Four other donors—the EU, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Australia—contributed more than
$100 million each.

Donors in 2014
In 2014, 26 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, three states
not party, the EU, and three international institutions3
contributed a total of $416.8 million to mine action.
The majority of the funding came from just a few
donors. The top five donors contributed a total of
$301.8 million, representing almost three-quarters of
all international funding for 2014. The US remained the
largest mine action donor, followed by the EU, Japan,

Norway, and the Netherlands. Two countries entered the
top 10—Denmark and Finland—replacing Australia and
Sweden, which reduced their contributions by a combined
total of $13 million. Thirteen donors contributed less
than $1 million each.
Support from States Parties in 2014 accounted for
55% of all donor funding with 26 countries providing
approximately $230 million, down from a total of $278
million in 2013. The top five State Party contributors—
Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and
Germany—provided $152 million (36%).
In 2014, the EU and its member states4 contributed
a total of $166 million and accounted for 40% of total
international support reported, up from the $153 million
provided in 2013 (35% of total international funding in
2013).
Based on available data as of November 2015,
funding for mine action in 2014 decreased by $23 million.
Twelve donors decreased their funding, led by Japan ($15
million down), the UK ($10 million down), Australia ($8
million down), Norway ($8 million down), and Sweden
($5 million down).
In contrast, 11 donors contributed more in 2014 than
they did in 2013, including a $28 million increase from the
EU, notably through the disbursement of approximately
4

3

The Common Humanitarian Fund (Sudan), the OPEC Fund for International Development, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
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Seventeen EU member states provided funding in 2014: Austria,
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK).

Support for Mine Action

Summary of major changes in 2014
Change

Donors

Combined Total

Decrease of more than $5
million

Australia, Japan, Norway, the UK, and Sweden

$45.4 million decrease

Decrease of less than $5
million

Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Luxembourg,
Spain, and Switzerland

$10.2 million decrease

Increase of more than $1
million

Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands, and the US

$37.8 million increase

Increase of less than $1
million

Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, Italy, New
Zealand, Slovenia, and South Korea

$2.9 million increase

Donors from 2013 that
discontinued their support
in 2014

Colombia, Oman, and the UAE

$9.5 million provided in
2013

New donors in 2014

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the Common Humanitarian
Fund, OPEC Fund for International Development,
and the OSCE

$1.4 million provided in
2014

Changes in mine action funding in national currency terms and US$ terms*
Donors

Australia

Amount of decrease/
increase (national
currency)

% change from 2013
(national currency)

Amount of decrease/
increase (US$)

% change from
2013 (US$)

- A$7,588,000

-51%

-7,832,774

-54%

+ C$281,373

+3%

-279,639

-4%

- ¥1,056,301,774

-17%

-14,914,242

-23%

+ NZ$892,460

+11%

+830,399

+12%

Norway

- NOK28,211,631

-10%

-7,785,827

-16%

Sweden

- SEK30,730,000

-37%

-5,129,558

-39%

- CHF347,941

-2%

-137,561

-1%

- £6,605,855

-45%

-9,661,924

-42%

Canada
Japan
New Zealand

Switzerland
UK

* Average exchange rates for 2014: A$1=US$0.9034; C$1.1043=US$1; DKK5.6151=US$1; €1=US$1.3297; ¥105.74=US$1; NZ$0.8313=US$1;
NOK6.2969=US$1; £1=US$1.6484; SEK6.8576=US$1; and CHF0.9147=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2
January 2015, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G5a/current/default.htm.

$25 million to mine action projects in Angola. The US
provided $4.2 million more than in 2013, while Denmark
and the Netherlands increased their assistance by more
than $2 million each.
Three donors from 2013 did not report any contribution
to mine action in 2014: Colombia, Oman, and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), the latter of which provided more
than $9 million in 2013. Five new donors—one State Party,
one state not party, and three institutions—were identified
in 2014: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Common Humanitarian
Fund (Sudan), the OPEC Fund for International
Development, and the OSCE.
However, as shown in the table above, changes in the
exchange rates between national currencies and the US
dollar significantly affected the US dollar value of some
contributions. For instance, whereas Japan has provided
¥5.2 billion in 2014, ¥1 billion less than in 2013 and
representing a 17% decrease, the value of its contribution
when expressed in US dollars results in a 23% decrease.
Similarly, Canada’s contribution dropped by 4% in US
dollar terms during 2014, despite rising by 3% in national
currency terms.

Funding paths
In addition to bilateral aid, donors provided funding
via several trust fund mechanisms, including the UN
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF),
administered by UNMAS; the ITF Enhancing Human
Security (established by the government of Slovenia); the
Common Humanitarian Fund in Sudan; and the NATO
Partnership for Peace Fund.
In 2014, contributions to the VTF totaled $45.1 million
from 22 donors, compared to $51 million from 23 donors in
2013.5 Japan, the EU, and Australia were the largest donors
to the VTF, amounting to half of all contributions. Several
small donors used the VTF to contribute to mine action,
including Andorra, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Saudi
Arabia, and South Korea. Six donors and two international
institutions allocated $8 million in 2014 through the ITF for
mine action programs in nine states and one area, as well
as for global activities.6 Other organizations that received
5

UNMAS, Annual Report 2014, September 2015, pp. 22–23, www.
mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/UNMAS 2014 Annual
Report.pdf.

6

ITF Enhancing Human Security, Annual Report 2014, March 2015, pp.
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a significant proportion of contributions in 2014 included
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
($18.2 million) and the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) ($10.7 million).

Recipients
A total of 42 states and three other areas received $358.8
million from 33 donors in 2014. A further $58 million,
designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to
institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without
a designated recipient state or area. Most advocacy
funding is contained within this category of funding.
Of the 45 recipients in 2014, 29 states and one other
area received more than $1 million each. Afghanistan
received the largest amount of funding ($49.3 million)
from the largest number of donors (14). Twelve states, or
27% of all recipients, had only one donor.7
As in previous years, a small number of countries received
the majority of funding. The top five recipient states—
Afghanistan, Lao PDR, Iraq, Angola, and Cambodia—
received 45% of all international support in 2014.

receiving $18 million less than in 2013. Fluctuation may
be a reflection of shifts in donor priorities, changes in
local situations, as well as the closing of some programs.
Uncertain and changing levels of mine action support
received could negatively impact the ability of some
affected states to comply with their Mine Ban Treaty
obligations in a timely manner. Such concerns were for
instance raised by Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad,
and Zimbabwe regarding their clearance obligations, and
by Ukraine regarding its stockpile destruction obligation.8

Funding by thematic sector

Contributions by thematic sector in 20149
Sector

Amount

Recipient

(US$ million)

Amount

58.0

Libya

6.9

Afghanistan

49.3

Ukraine

6.6

Lao PDR

37.3

Egypt

6.3

Iraq

36.3

Lebanon

6.1

Angola

32.6

Myanmar

5.7

Cambodia

30.3

Tajikistan

4.2

Turkey

26.3

Palau

2.3

Vietnam

14.3

Zimbabwe

2.2

Colombia

11.5

Somaliland

1.7

South Sudan

10.8

Syria

1.4

Mozambique

10.3

Georgia

1.3

Congo, DR

10.3

Yemen

1.2

Palestine

10.2

Thailand

1.0

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

8.7

Chad

1.0

Sri Lanka

8.4

Serbia

1.0

Somalia

7.4

Other
recipients*

5.9

Total

281.8

68%

68.5

16%

Victim assistance

27.7

7%

Advocacy

20.7

5%

Capacity-building

14.9

4%

3.2

less than 1%

416.8

100%

Various

(US$ million)

Global

Percentage
of total
contribution

Clearance and risk
education

International support recipients in 2014
Recipient

Total
contribution
($ million)

Stockpile destruction
Total

Almost 70% of mine action funding in 2014 supported
clearance and risk education activities. Victim assistance
support dropped by $1.9 million from 2013, and
represented 7% of total international support to mine
action. Stockpile destruction totaled just more than
$3 million, most of which was provided by the EU
and Germany for the destruction of Ukraine’s PFM-1
landmines through the NATO Support Agency (with a
total of $2.5 million).10
8

Mine Action Program of Afghanistan (MAPA), Annual Report 1393,
September 2015, p. 40, www.macca.org.af/macca/wp-content/
uploads/2015/09/MAPA-Annual-Report-1393.pdf; “Lack of funding
could jeopardize demining operations in Angola” (in Portuguese),
Deutsche Welle (DW), 9 July 2015, www.dw.com/pt/falta-de-financiamento-põe-em-risco-a-desminagem-em-angola/a-18574335; “Money
a worry for deminers ahead of 2019 clean-up deadline,” The Phnom
Penh Post, 6 June 2015, www.phnompenhpost.com/post-weekend/
money-worry-deminers-ahead-2019-clean-deadline; statement of
Chad, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, June 2014,
www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/tuesday/07c_CLEARING_MINED_AREAS_-_Chad.pdf; Zimbabwe’s Fourth
Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, December 2013,
www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC/clearing-minedareas/art5_extensions/countries/Zimbabwe-ExtensionRequest-Received-31JDecember2013.pdf; and statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban
Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Updates by States Parties that have
missed their deadlines for Article 4 implementation, April 2014, www.
apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-apr14/7_
ARTICLE_4_STATES_PARTIES_MISSED_DEADLINES_-_Ukraine.pdf.

9

In 2013, international support was distributed among the following
sectors: clearance and risk education ($300.3 million/68% of total international support), victim assistance ($29.6 million/7%), advocacy ($16
million/4%), capacity-building ($9.4 million/2%), stockpile destruction
($5.2 million/1%), and various activities ($79.3 million/18%).

10

Email from Jérôme Legrand, Policy Officer, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Conventional Weapons and Space Division (K1), European
External Action Service (EEAS), 11 June 2015; and Germany Mine Ban
Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 16 March 2015.

416.8

Note: State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold;
other areas are indicated by italics.
* Other recipients in 2014 included: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Burundi, Croatia, Guinea, Jordan, Kosovo, the Marshall Islands,
Mauritania, Peru, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, Sudan,
and Western Sahara. Each received less than $1 million.

In 2014, 35 states and areas experienced a change of
more than 20% in funding compared to 2013, including
24 recipients receiving less support. Turkey was the
recipient with the largest upward fluctuation, receiving
$26 million more than in 2013, while Afghanistan was
the recipient with the largest downward fluctuation,
22–23, www.itf-fund.si/public/upload/brosure/itf_ar_2014.pdf.
7

Albania, Armenia, Burundi, Chad, Egypt, Guinea, the Marshall Islands,
Mauritania, Peru, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, and Turkey.
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In 2014, $281.8 million, or 68% of all reported support for mine
action, went toward clearance and risk education activities.
This represents a decrease of $18.5 million from 2013.
Many donors reported clearance and risk education
as a combined figure, although clearance accounts for
most of the reported funding with 23 donors contributing
$237.9 million. Nine donors reported contributions
totaling $8 million specifically for risk education projects
in nine countries.

Victim assistance11
Direct international support for victim assistance activities
reached $27.7 million in 2014, down from $29.6 million in
2013. This represents 7% of all reported support for mine
action in 2014, about the same share as in 2013.
Seventeen12 of the 33 donors identified reported
contributing to victim assistance projects in 14 States
Parties, four states not party, and one area.13 Most mineaffected countries did not receive any direct international
support for victim assistance.

Advocacy
In 2014, 5% of all reported support for mine action
went toward advocacy activities ($20.7 million). Of the
33 donors reporting international contributions to mine
action, 18 reported supporting advocacy activities.
Advocacy activities included, but were not limited to,
support for the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference
in Maputo in June 2014 and the Convention on Cluster
Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties in San Jose
in September 2014; travel sponsorship through UNDP;
and, contributions to the Implementation Support Units.
GICHD, Geneva Call, the ICBL-CMC and its Landmine
and Cluster Munition Monitor also received donor
support for advocacy.

National Contributions in 2014
While there has been more transparency from affected
states, overall national contributions to mine action
continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties report
national funding in their annual Article 7 reports. States
Parties such as Algeria and Iraq, as well as states not party
India, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam—all mine-affected states
with significant contamination and major clearance
operations, usually conducted by the army—have never
reported annual expenditures. In March 2014, the media
reported that the government’s contribution to demining
11

Funding for victim assistance activities are especially difficult to track
because many donors report that they provide support for victims
through more general programs for development and the rights of
persons with disabilities.

12

Victim assistance donors included: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovenia, and the US.

13

States Parties recipients of international assistance for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia,
Colombia, Croatia, DR Congo, Iraq, Jordan, Peru, Somalia, South
Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. States not party that received international assistance for victim assistance were: Lao PDR, Myanmar,
Palestine, and Vietnam. Western Sahara was the sole other area that
received victim assistance funding.

in Vietnam was around $30 million per year.14
Thirteen affected states reported $193.6 million in
contributions to mine action from their national budget
in 2014, approximately $7 million less than the $201
million reported in 2013 (a 4% decrease).15 Angola ($121
million) accounted for 63% of the total. Additionally, four
States Parties reported contributing a large part to their
own mine action programs: Bosnia and Herzegovina
($14.6 million, 63%), Chile ($4.9 million, 100%), Croatia
($28 million, 60%), and Ecuador ($5.5 million, 100%).
Whereas data about national support remains
incomplete, it has accounted to about 30% of total mine
action funding in 2010–2014.

Summary of contributions: 2010–2014
International Support

National Support

US$ (millions)

Clearance and risk education

Years

Peacekeeping Operations
Peacekeeping in the Central African Republic, Côte
d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Darfur, Lebanon, Somalia, South
Sudan, and Sudan (Abyei16 and Darfur), as well as
Western Sahara, had mine action programs that were
partially funded by UN General Assembly assessments
as part of peacekeeping mission budgets in 2014.
In 2014–2015, an estimated $166 million was allocated
to mine action for peacekeeping missions globally, a
10% increase from the previous year.17 The breakdown
of assessed budget per mission was not available as of
November 2015.

14

“VN calls on donors to help with clean up of explosives,” Vietnam
News, 15 March 2014, vietnamnews.vn/society/252370/vn-calls-ondonors-to-help-with-clean-up-of-explosives.html. The information provided, however, was not specific enough and therefore not included
Monitor calculations.

15

Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador,
Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

16

The Abyei region is located in the Southern Kordofan state in Sudan.

17

UNMAS, “Overview of UNMAS Funding,” undated but last accessed
on 20 October 2015. www.mineaction.org/funding/unmas.
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Status of the Convention
© ICBL-CMC, June 2015

1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction (1997 Mine Ban Treaty)
Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature
from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which
was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is
signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the
treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign
rather they may become bound without signature through
a one step procedure known as accession. According to
Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any State
that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a)
and succession is indicated below with (s).
As of 18 November 2015 there were 162 State Parties

States Parties
Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99
Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06

Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
Congo, Rep 4 May 01 (a)
Congo, DR 2 May 02 (a)
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99
Côte d Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)
Estonia 12 May 04 (a)
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
Finland 9 Jan 12 (a)
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98

International
diplomatic work
on the Mine Ban
Treaty continues
at intersessional
meetings in Geneva.
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Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98
Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01
Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03
Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06
Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98
Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98
Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99
Indonesia 4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07
Iraq 15 Aug 07 (a)
Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99
Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98
Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98
Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98
Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01
Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a)
Kuwait 30 Jul 07 (a)
Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)
Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a)
Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99
Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03
Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99
Macedonia FYR 9 Sep 98 (a)
Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99
Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98
Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99
Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00
Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98
Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01
Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00
Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98
Montenegro 23 Oct 06 (s)
Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98
Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98
Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a)
Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99
New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99
Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a)
Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98
Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98
Oman 20 Aug 14 (a)
Palau 18 Nov 07 (a)
Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98
Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a)
Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
Poland 4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98
Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00
Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00
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Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98
São Tomé & Príncipe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a)
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01
Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Somalia 16 Apr 12 (a)
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98
South Sudan 11 Nov 11 (s)
Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99
Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03
Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02
Swaziland 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98
Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98
Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a)
Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00
Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98
Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a)
Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00
Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98
Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99
Turkey 25 Sep 03 (a)
Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98
Tuvalu 13 September 2011 (a)
Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01
Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99
Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98
Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98

Signatories
Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97

States not Party
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Burma/Myanmar
China
Cuba
Egypt
Georgia
India
Iran
Israel
Kazakhstan
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kyrgyzstan
Lao PDR
Lebanon

Libya
Micronesia
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Pakistan
Palestine
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Syria
Tonga
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
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18 September 1997

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
Their Destruction

Preamble
The States Parties
Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim
hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and
defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct
economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the
repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons,
and have other severe consequences for years after
emplacement,
Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face
the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed
throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,
Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for
the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,
Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines
would also be an important confidence-building measure,
Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps
and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed
to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this
Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,
Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States
to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production
and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,
Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the
past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming
at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the
principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total
ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts
to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,
Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996
and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the
international community to negotiate an international
and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,
Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to
work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United
Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed
to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects,
Basing themselves on the principle of international
humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed
conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not
unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and
materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the
principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,
Have agreed as follows:

Article 1
General obligations
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any
circumstances:
a) To use anti-personnel mines;
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b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire,
stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone
to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party
under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the
destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance
with the provisions of this Convention.

Article 2
Definitions
1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to
be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a
person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or
more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the
presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to
a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices,
are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of
being so equipped.
2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed
under, on or near the ground or other surface area and
to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a
person or a vehicle.
3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to
protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached
to or placed under the mine and which activates when an
attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.
4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines,
but does not involve the transfer of territory containing
emplaced anti-personnel mines.

but not later than four years after the entry into force of
this Convention for that State Party.

Article 5
Destruction of anti-personnel mines in
mined areas
1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the
destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas
under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but
not later than ten years after the entry into force of this
Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all
areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced
and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or
control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected
by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained
therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least
be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps
and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed
to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy
or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines
referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may
submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or
a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline
for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel
mines, for a period of up to ten years.

5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due
to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

4. Each request shall contain:

Article 3

	b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:

Exceptions
1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article
1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti- personnel
mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is
permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed
the minimum number absolutely necessary for the
above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose
of destruction is permitted.

Article 4
Destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines
Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that
are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible
46 / L a n d m i n e M o n i to r 2 0 15

a) The duration of the proposed extension;

		(i) The preparation and status of work conducted
under national demining programs;
		(ii) The financial and technical means available
to the State Party for the destruction of all the
anti-personnel mines; and
		(iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the
State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines
in mined areas;
	c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
	d) Any other information relevant to the request for
the proposed extension.
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by
a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting
whether to grant the request for an extension period.
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6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3,
4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension
period a State Party shall submit relevant additional
information on what has been undertaken in the previous
extension period pursuant to this Article.

	b) The financial, technological and human resources
that are required for the implementation of the
program;

Article 6

	d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence
of mine-related injuries or deaths;

International cooperation and
assistance
1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each
State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance,
where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent
possible.
2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have
the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, material and scientific and technological
information concerning the implementation of this
Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue
restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.
3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide
assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and
economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine
awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided,
inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions,
the International Committee of the Red Cross, national
Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or
on a bilateral basis.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide
assistance for mine clearance and related activities.
Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the
United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations
or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing
to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal
with demining.
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide
assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti- personnel mines.
6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information
to the database on mine clearance established within
the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national
points of contact on mine clearance.
7. States Parties may request the United Nations,
regional organizations, other States Parties or other
competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora
to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national
demining program to determine, inter alia:
	a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine
problem;

	c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy
all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the
jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;

e) Assistance to mine victims;
	f) The relationship between the Government of the
concerned State Party and the relevant governmental,
inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that
will work in the implementation of the program.
8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance
under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a
view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of
agreed assistance programs.

Article 7
Transparency measures
1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any
event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of
this Convention for that State Party on:
	a) The national implementation measures referred to
in Article 9;
	b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines
owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or
control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity
and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
	c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined
areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to
include as much detail as possible regarding the type
and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in
each mined area and when they were emplaced;
	d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers
of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for
the development of and training in mine detection,
mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or
transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as
the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain
or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with
Article 3;
	e) The status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of anti-personnel mine production
facilities;
	f) The status of programs for the destruction of antipersonnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5,
including details of the methods which will be used in
destruction, the location of all destruction sites and
the applicable safety and environmental standards to
be observed;
	g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines
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destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention
for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in
accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along
with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of antipersonnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
	h) The technical characteristics of each type of antipersonnel mine produced, to the extent known, and
those currently owned or possessed by a State Party,
giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of
information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this
information shall include the dimensions, fusing,
explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate
mine clearance; and
	i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and
effective warning to the population in relation to all
areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.
2. The information provided in accordance with this
Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually,
covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April
of each year.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

Article 8
Facilitation and clarification of
compliance
1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate
with each other regarding the implementation of the
provisions of this Convention, and to work together in
a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States
Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek
to resolve questions relating to compliance with the
provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it
may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to
that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied
by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall
refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care
being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a
Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the
requesting State Party all information which would assist
in clarifying this matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within
that time period, or deems the response to the Request for
Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to
the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission,
accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to
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the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such
information shall be presented to the requested State Party
which shall have the right to respond.
4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States
Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request
the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification
requested.
5. The requesting State Party may propose through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening
of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the
matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all
States Parties with a request that they indicate whether
they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for
the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that
within 14 days from the date of such communication, at
least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special
Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties
within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall
consist of a majority of States Parties.
6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special
Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall
first determine whether to consider the matter further,
taking into account all information submitted by the
States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States
Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall
make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If
despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been
reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States
Parties present and voting.
7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the
Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting
of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of
the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are
authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.
8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the
States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties
shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on
its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and
voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite
a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission
shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the
States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties
to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of
up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance
with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to
the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or
control of the requested State Party.
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities
and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by
States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties.
Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party
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declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of
non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in factfinding missions on the territory or any other place under
the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if
the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the
States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties,
the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after
consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the
members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals
of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission
or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the
mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall
enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.
11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the
fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the
requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The
requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate
the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the
security of the mission to the maximum extent possible
while they are on territory under its control.
12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested
State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into
the territory of the requested State Party the necessary
equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering
information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its
arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party
of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of
its fact-finding mission.
13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure
that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to
speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide
information related to the alleged compliance issue.
14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the
fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under
its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue
could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject
to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:
	a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information
and areas;
	b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the
requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
	c) The physical protection and safety of the members
of the fact-finding mission.

and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless
otherwise agreed.
16. All information provided in confidence and not related
to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be
treated on a confidential basis.
17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting
of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States
Parties the results of its findings.
18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting
of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information,
including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission,
and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified
period of time. The requested State Party shall report on
all measures taken in response to this request.
19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special
Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States
Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or
resolve the matter under consideration, including the
initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with
international law. In circumstances where the issue at
hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond
the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of
the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States
Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including
the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.
20.The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special
Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to
reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by
consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States
Parties present and voting.

Article 9
National implementation measures
Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of
penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken
by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 10
Settlement of disputes
1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with
each other to settle any dispute that may arise with
regard to the application or the interpretation of this
Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute
before the Meeting of the States Parties.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such
arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to
demonstrate through alternative means its compliance
with this Convention.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute
to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it
deems appropriate, including offering its good offices,
calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the
settlement procedure of their choice and recommending
a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory
of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days,

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this
Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.
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Article 11
Meetings of the States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
a) The operation and status of this Convention;
	b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under
the provisions of this Convention;
	c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
	d) The development of technologies to clear antipersonnel mines;
	e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
	f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties
as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations
within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until
the first Review Conference.
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a
Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as
the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the
International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant
non-governmental organizations may be invited to
attend these meetings as observers in accordance with
the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 12
Review Conferences
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry
into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences
shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall
in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this
Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the
International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant
non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend
each Review Conference as observers in accordance with
the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 13
Amendments
1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this
Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be
communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to
all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an
Amendment Conference should be convened to consider
the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the
Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that
they support further consideration of the proposal, the
Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to
which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as
the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the
International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant
non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend
each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance
with the agreed Rules of Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a
Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties
request that it be held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted
by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present
and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to
the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into
force for all States Parties to this Convention which have
accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of
instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties.
Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining
State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of
acceptance.

Article 14

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:

Costs

	
a) To review the operation and status of this
Convention;

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the
Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by
the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United
Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

	b) To consider the need for and the interval between
further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in
paragraph 2 of Article 11;
	c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties
as provided for in Article 5; and
	d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions
related to the implementation of this Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as
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2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of
any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States
Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of
assessment adjusted appropriately.
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Article 15

Article 19

Signature

Reservations

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September
1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by
all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997,
and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York
from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to
reservations.

Article 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance
or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has
not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

Article 17
Entry into force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day
of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of
the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter
into force on the first day of the sixth month after the
date on which that State has deposited its instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 18
Provisional application
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending
its entry into force.

Article 20
Duration and withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention.
It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States
Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations
Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall
include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this
withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after
the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six- month period,
the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of
the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention
shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue
fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant
rules of international law.

Article 21
Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby
designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

Article 22
Authentic texts
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic,
Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are
equally authentic, shall be deposited with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.
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Appendix

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Glossary

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AXO

abandoned explosive ordnance

BAC

battle area clearance

CCW

1980 Convention on Conventional
Weapons

Abandoned explosive ordnance – Explosive ordnance
that has not been used during an armed conflict, that
has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed
conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader
category of explosive remnants of war.

CHA

confirmed hazardous area

CMC

Cluster Munition Coalition

DfID

UK Department for International
Development

DPO

disabled persons’ organization

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

ERW

explosive remnants of war

EU

European Union

GICHD

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining

HI

Handicap International

HRW

Human Rights Watch

ICBL

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

IED

improvised explosive device

IMAS

International Mine Action Standards

IMSMA

Information Management System for Mine
Action

ISU

Implementation Support Unit

NGO

non-governmental organization

NPA

Norwegian People’s Aid

NSAG

non-state armed group

OAS

Organization of American States

SHA

suspected hazardous area

UN

United Nations

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

UNMAS

United Nations Mine Action Service

UXO

unexploded ordnance

VA

victim assistance

Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become
a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.
Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can
be through signature and ratification, or through accession.
“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a
minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or
suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been
applied when the commitment of additional resources is
considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results
expected.
Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty,
an antihandling device “means a device intended to
protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached
to or placed under the mine and which activates when an
attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”
Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty,
an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be
exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a
person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or
more persons.”
Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an
antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated
by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as
opposed to a person.”
Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the
process by which a suspected hazardous area is released
based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does
not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.
Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process
by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine
detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demL a n d m i n e M o n i to r 2 0 15 / 53
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ining equipment) are used to gather information that
locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area.
Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire
area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.
Battle area clearance – The systematic and controlled
clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive
hazards are known not to include landmines.
Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine,
ERW or IED incident, either through direct contact with
the device or by being in its proximity.
Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/
or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a
specified area to a specified depth.
Cleared land – A defined area cleared through the
removal and/or destruction of all specified mine and
ERW hazards to a specified depth.
Cluster munition – According to the Convention on
Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is “A conventional
munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms,
and includes those submunitions.” Cluster munitions
consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from
the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (bomblets) over a wide area. Bomblets are
typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.
Community-based rehabilitation – Programs in affected
communities (often rural areas) that are designed to supplement facility-based programs in urban centers. These
programs improve service delivery, equal opportunities,
and protect human rights for a larger group of people
with disabilities who have limited access to service, due
to uneven service distribution, high treatment cost, and
limited human resource capacity.
Confirmed hazardous area – An area where the presence
of mine/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the
basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.
Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal
of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping,
clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.
Explosive remnants of war – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants
of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded
from the definition.
Explosive ordnance disposal – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of
explosive ordnance.
Improvised explosive device – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives
or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device
(IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated.
Victim-activated IEDs are banned under the Mine Ban
Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.
International Mine Action Standards – Standards issued
by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action
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by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in
some cases, defining international requirements and
specifications.
Information Management System for Mine Action – The
UN’s preferred information system for the management
of critical data in UN-supported field programs. IMSMA
provides users with support for data collection, data
storage, reporting, information analysis, and project
management activities.
Land release – The process of applying all reasonable
effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and
suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk
involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance
of land with actual mine/ERW contamination.
Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating
day-to-day mine action operations, normally under
the supervision of a national mine action authority.
Some mine action centers also implement mine action
activities.
Mine/ERW risk education – Activities which seek to
reduce the risk of injury from mines and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including
public information dissemination, education and
training, and community mine action liaison.
National mine action authority – A governmental body,
normally interministerial in nature, responsible for managing and regulating a national mine action program.
Non-state armed groups – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations
carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as
a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal
gangs and state-supported proxy forces.
Non-technical survey – The collection and analysis of
data, without the use of technical interventions, about
the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define
better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and
where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically
include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking
information from central institutions and other relevant
sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.
Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain
evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.
Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining,
the term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy
all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.
Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task,
separates from a parent munition (cluster munition).
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Survivors – People who have been directly injured by an
explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and
have survived the incident.
Suspected hazardous area – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the
basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.
Technical survey – The collection and analysis of data,
using appropriate technical interventions, about the
presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define
better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and
where it is not, and to support land release prioritization
and decision-making processes through the provision of
evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual
search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or
full sub-surface search.
Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that
have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded
ordnance.
Unexploded ordnance – Unexploded ordnance (UXO)
refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for
some reason failed to detonate.
Victim – The individual killed or injured by a mine/ERW
explosion (casualty), his or her family, and community.
Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is
not limited to, data collection and needs assessment,
emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure
the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families, and communities in society.
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